



Daily Report

Sub-Saharan Africa

FBIS-AFR-93-193
Thursday
7 October 1993

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Rwanda

UN Launches Peacekeeping Operation UNAMR

AB0610132693 Kigali Radiodiffusion Nationale de la Republique Rwandaise in French 0430 GMT 6 Oct 93

[Excerpts] The UN Security Council has decided to launch a new peacekeeping operation in Africa under the name of UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda [UNAMR]. The mission will be in charge of the supervision of the transition process before elections are held in 1995. In Resolution No. 872, adopted unanimously last night, the UN Security Council's 15 members authorized Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali to deploy an initial contingent of 800 soldiers in Kigali for an initial six-month period. [passage omitted]

According to the UN, UNAMR will have over 2,500 soldiers in its ranks in the course of 1994. It will be the biggest UN peacekeeping mission in Africa after those in Somalia and Mozambique. It is the 16th UN peacekeeping operation in the world. UNAMR will supervise in particular the implementation of the cease-fire between the Rwandan Government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front, monitor the refugee repatriation process, and the resettlement of displaced people. The UN Security Council noted that UNAMR was being put in place at the request of the parties involved and thus stressed the need for full cooperation on the part of these parties. [passage omitted]

Premier Lauds Resolution

EA0610214693 Kigali Radiodiffusion Nationale de la Republique Rwandaise in French 1115 GMT 6 Oct 93

[Excerpts] The prime minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, has made a declaration on the UN resolution calling on all Rwandans to support the Arusha agreements to enable them to fulfil their final goal of peace. Here is Mrs. Agathe Uwilingiyimana:

[Uwilingiyimana] Rwandans and dear friends of Rwanda: I would now like to inform you that the UN Security Council in New York has just adopted an important resolution to send blue helmet troops to Rwanda as soon as possible. The resolution the UN Security Council adopted is No. 872 [words indistinct]. On behalf of the government and the people of Rwanda, I wish to express my deep gratitude to His Excellency Dr. Butrus Butrus-Ghali, the UN secretary general, and the president and all members of the UN Security Council for the important step they have taken in the interests of peace in Rwanda and concomitantly in the interests of the entire Rwandan people. [passage omitted]

The UN Security Council has also asked the UN secretary general to come to an agreement as soon as possible with the Rwandan authorities on the status of the new UN assistance mission to Rwanda. I accordingly call on the ministers of foreign affairs, justice, civil service and defence to act together immediately to draft an agreement between the Rwandan Government and the UN.

On the status of the mission, inasmuch as the first units of the neutral international force will arrive in less than two weeks.

I take this opportunity to unequivocally condemn the disturbances which took place in some parts of the country last weekend. In the Taba commune, trouble erupted on 3 October, 1993. The troubles were of a political nature and opposed to the Republican Democratic Movement [MDR] and Republican National Movement for Democracy and Development [MRNDD]. Some people are missing and others have fled their homes. The day before yesterday, on 3 October 1993, people who were returning from meetings held at Nyamirambo Stadium [in Kigali] were attacked by troublemakers throwing stones at them. All this demonstrates that if we fail to be vigilant, a retrogressive step could be taken on the path toward peace. All Rwandans must realize that the peace which has been realized is fragile, and all of us, together, must do everything possible to safeguard it. [passage omitted]

The Rwandan Government is determined to take firm steps against every troublemaker. Investigations into the events of last weekend have already begun and the culprits will be punished in an exemplary manner.

Rwandans: I once again call on you to avoid the pitfalls of those opposing peace in Rwanda and to prepare yourselves to welcome the UN, to enable it to accomplish its mission of assuring security in our country. Thank you.

Former Rebels Accuse Government of Violating Peace Pact

AB0610151593 Paris AFP in English 1451 GMT 6 Oct 93

[Text] Kigali, Oct 6 (AFP)—The formerly rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR) on Wednesday [6 October] accused Rwanda's coalition government of passing economic measures in breach of the terms of a peace pact signed in August.

In a statement, FPR Military Commander Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe said the government was "making financial commitments that could prejudice the achievement of the programme of a broad-based transitional government."

"The so-called government continues to make important decisions... regarding privatisations, the transfer of decision-making powers, changes in the usual way of naming local administrators and the launching of problematic projects, well outside its Arusha accord mandate," the statement said.

Kanyarengwe accused Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana's coalition of allowing itself to be manipulated by President Juvenal Habyarimana with the complicity of French authorities.

The FPR dissociated itself in the statement from the contested government decisions and declared that the coalition's job under the Arusha accord was only to manage the small central African nation's day-to-day affairs.

The president of Rwanda's Constitutional Court, Joseph Kavaruganda, was said by informed sources here to have backed Kanyarengwe's charges that the government was overstepping its duties.

Kavaruganda reportedly wrote to the prime minister to inform her that decisions taken by the government after the signing of the peace pact at Arusha in Tanzania on August 4 were not constitutional.

The FPR also called on donor countries and agencies to set up a commission to investigate accusations against people accused of embezzling aid. The movement named Habyarimana, his close relatives and other senior officials.

"Signing a peace accord has not changed the dictatorial nature of power in Kigali," Kanyarengwe said.

The FPR statement came hours after the U.N. Security Council voted in New York on Tuesday to send up to 2,500 peacekeepers to Rwanda, where a new government is due to be installed by the end of 1995 after general elections.

The resolution adopted unanimously stresses that the U.N. force will be put in place only "at the request of the parties and under peaceful conditions with the full cooperation of all the parties."

It provides for an initial six-month mission but stipulates that this will be extended beyond the first three months only after the council reviews a report from the secretary general "as to whether or not substantive progress has been made towards the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement."

A first contingent of U.N. troops will be deployed in Kigali to allow implementation of institutions involved in the transition.

The peacekeeping force should eventually become the third largest in Africa after the missions in Somalia and Mozambique.

U.N. Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali estimated the cost of the mission at 62.6 million dollars for the first six months.

Habyarimana's Talks in Belgium Viewed

BR0610162293 Brussels LE SOIR in French 6 Oct 93 p 8

[Report by Veronique Kiesel: "President Habyarimana Ends Visit to Belgium; UN Troops and Economic Aid for Rwanda"]

[Text] Two months ago, after laborious negotiations, the Rwandan Government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front [FPR] signed the Arusha Peace Accord that ended the

strange civil war that began three years ago on 1 October 1990 with FPR attacks in the north of the country.

"It is in order to present this agreement and to request support for its implementation from friendly countries that I have undertaken a tour of Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, Zaire, and Kenya and then of our Western partners," Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana said in Brussels yesterday. "After Belgium, I will go to the United States, then France. I am anxious to thank these countries for their support, but I am also asking them to help us make a fresh start. I have met in Belgium with several personalities—his majesty the king and Messrs. Dehaene, Delcroix, Swaelen, and Nothomb—from whom I received a favorable response, as I did from European Commissioner Marin [responsible for Third World]."

According to the peace agreement, the transitional institutions should have been established in the month following the signing. But although a prime minister, Mrs. Agathe Uwilingiyimana, was indeed appointed at the beginning of August, she has not yet formed her government, because this is supposed to take place in the presence of the neutral international force that the United Nations is due to send out, but which is still not there. "With its system of exploratory missions followed by reports and internal consultations, the UN decision-making process is too long. But a consensus does seem to be taking shape, and we should finalize it in the coming days. Nevertheless, I am rather anxious: According to our estimates, we need some 4,500 men to help us to complete the transition period. According to my information, however, the UN secretary general reckons that 2,500 men will be enough. Be that as it may, the Belgian defense minister has confirmed to me that Belgium will take part in this future mission."

Economically, Rwanda is in a rather difficult situation: "Our economy was already ailing in 1990, and of course the war has not resolved anything. We signed agreements with the IMF and the World Bank, which we have of course been unable to honor, because we have had to purchase weapons and supplies. Now we want to improve our macroeconomic outlook, but we have a serious shortage of currency. Nevertheless we have reached an agreement in principle on the release of credits due to us, which were frozen during the war."

Zaire

Mobutu Comments on Talks on Constitution

LD0710032493 Kinshasa Tele-Zaire Television Network in French 1900 GMT 6 Oct 93

[Interview with President Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko by AZAP Chairman Landu Lusala Khasa in Gbadolite on 5 October; announcers read Mobutu and Khasa comments]

[Text] [Khasa] Citizen President, the attention of the Zairian people has focused on the political negotiations at the People's Palace over the last few days. What do you think of the results to which these consultations have led?

[Mobutu] Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your question. First and foremost, I would like to remind you of the general aims of the negotiators who have taken part in this important conference and of the outcome of their talks, which seem to me to be positive and promising for our people. First of all, they aimed at defining a constitutional framework agreed on in a consensus by all Zairian politicians acting on behalf of the nation. It is also important to hail the ending of the parallelism in the transitional institutions that has affected the parliament—the legislative body of the transition—and the government of the same period. I hardly need to tell you how much the situation of parallel institutions bred a feeling of confusion and discomfort. The negotiators also determined dates for a referendum and for elections. This is an achievement that cannot be denied, just like the consensus reached on a single project for a constitution designed to govern the Third Republic, a project that is to be submitted to the people as primarily sovereign through a referendum. All this seems positive and praiseworthy to me.

As for the appointment of the head of the other important transitional institution, namely the government, and of the other members of that team, this is within the normal framework of the enforcement of the rules of the game and of the relationship between all the transitional institutions. The new transitional parliament, in view of the prerogatives that it has been granted by the negotiators in the People's Palace, will be responsible for the appointment of the team in charge of the executive branch of this transition. I will not interfere in any way with this appointment, and I will wait calmly for the parliament to submit to me for approval the name of the new prime minister, the head of the government.

[Khasa] Does this mean that you guarantee that, as far as you are concerned, the sharing of power is clearly defined between the institutions that are to lead Zaire to the Third Republic?

[Mobutu] Of course I do. Things are clear. I know my prerogatives as head of state and those of the transitional parliament that will appoint a prime minister to be entrusted with the formation of a cabinet answerable for its actions and its decisions before the parliament. The head of state will not be responsible for dealing with the ordinary matters of the state. Each institution will fully enjoy the prerogatives it has been granted in the new political context that has just been set up through the recent political negotiations, namely the constitutional act for the transitional period.

As for me, I intend to face up fully, as one with sovereign power, to all the prerogatives granted to me, in particular in my preserves, namely diplomacy, national defense,

and the security of persons and their possessions throughout the national territory.

As in the past, I shall concern myself most attentively with seeing to and guaranteeing the unity of the nation and preserving a climate of peace and harmony throughout the immense territory of the republic.

[Khasa] Therefore, day-to-day matters will well and truly be the exclusive responsibility of the government: You will, therefore, no longer involve yourself with them at all?

[Mobutu] I think I have been clear. The Constitution—I mean the new constitutional document of the transitional period—cannot be clearer on this subject. The government will concern itself with day-to-day matters and the prime minister and head of that government will see to it that the head of state is fully informed about the running of the state. The prime minister and government will fully assume their powers and prerogatives. They may be assured of my total support and assistance in helping them to carry out the general policy of the country to a successful conclusion and above all to succeed in implementing a policy of economic and social recovery in an atmosphere of national unity and social peace.

[Khasa] Citizen President, over the past two years our country Zaire has experienced tragic events, instances of looting, and generalized disorder. Shortly after the debates at the People's Palace, do you think that the situation is going to become stable finally, or, on the contrary, do you fear that these events, which are remembered with sadness, may for one reason or other be repeated?

[Mobutu] It is true that Zaire has just experienced a difficult period, which has also personally affected and upset me. Like the Zairian people as a whole, I strongly hope that these events, which as you say with justification are remembered with sadness, will never be repeated. The time should now come for national reconstruction and renewal in all respects, and I shall take advantage of the opportunity you are giving me to issue a moving appeal to the 45 million Zairean men and women for harmony and unity of hearts so that all acts of violence, all divisions, all internal quarrels will stop forever and be replaced by the establishment of a new order that is propitious to the work and development for which we are all heartily wishing.

[Khasa] Anyone speaking of the development of our country thinks automatically about the embargo suffered by Zaire in bilateral and multilateral cooperation for a good three years. How do you think this embargo may be broken?

[Mobutu] By imposing the embargo to which you refer, the West wanted to test our ability to bring the process of democratization to a successful conclusion. I think that our partners must get used to the idea that in spite of the many pitfalls that have been placed in our path, our

progress toward the democratization of our institutions is irreversible. The results registered at the recent talks at the Palais du Peuple are extremely revealing: on the specific subject of cooperation properly speaking, it is clear that our country Zaire, situated as it is in the heart of the black continent and with all its potential, has no option but to develop in harmony with the brotherly countries of Africa and in symbiosis with the other nations of a world that is becoming more interdependent every day.

Our partners are rightly insisting today on the security of persons and property and making this factor an indispensable condition for economic activity to start up again and for any initiative in the investment sector. It is easy to understand them.

We tell all nations and persons of good will who wish to restore relations with us of our determination to set off again on the right foot, to do everything possible to guarantee the security of the republic's institutions, and to safeguard the climate of healthy and honest cooperation that will benefit all the parties while strictly observing mutual respect.

[Khasa] This restoration of cooperation with our partners, especially the Western ones, is this something you want in the very near future?

[Mobutu] We intend to continue our policy of the outstretched hand toward our traditional partners and others, toward whom we are impelled by our determination to open up to all people of good will who believe in the rules of mutual respect in economic and human exchange.

I ask friendly countries like France, the United States, and—why not?—Belgium to show their goodwill so that their experience and skill, not to mention their material resources, might return to help the collapsed Zairian economy, which is in urgent need of a recovery program.

On behalf of the Zairian people, I want to ask them to forget the past and to turn toward a future made up of frank and fair cooperation, supported by respectful mutual understanding.

In the next few days I shall be busy receiving the representatives of the diplomatic corps accredited to me, starting

with those whom we call the trioka: the United States, France, and Belgium; countries which, as everyone knows, have invested in Zairian internal affairs.

[Khasa] Zaire is preparing to crown the democratization progress by organizing elections that everyone hopes will be fair and aboveboard. Are you ready to agree to the presence of foreign observers?

[Mobutu] Of course. Indeed, that is part of the rules adopted during the recent negotiations in the People's Palace. As long as these observers are neutral—I stress, neutral—in the full sense of the word, what is the problem? Just the opposite, this is our most earnest hope.

[Khasa] Citizen President, what is your estimation of the role played by Monsignor Monsengwo in the Zairian political crisis, in particular during the last negotiations?

[Mobutu] Far be it from me to minimize the role played by the Catholic prelate in the political arena these past two years, but I would advise him to act in a slightly more nationalist way in the future.

[Khasa] And what will have been the UN contribution to the resolution of the Zairean political impasse?

[Mobutu] The United Nations has played a truly positive role, and here you have given me the chance to thank UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali, who was kind enough to agree to my urgent request to send us a special envoy to Zaire in the context of a crisis that was continuing.

You are familiar with the role played by Minister Lakhdar Brahimi, a very important role, in bringing closer together the apparently unresolvable claims of the protagonists in the Zairian political crisis. He is soon to visit us for the third time, this time to celebrate with all our people the reconciliation of the sons and daughters of Zaire.

[Khasa] Thank you, Citizen President, for this exclusive interview with the national telegraphic agency. Before leaving you, might I not ask you to broaden the debate by receiving in the very near future the Zairian press as a whole, of all stripes, inviting also—why not?—our colleagues from the foreign press? It seems to me that the moment lends itself admirably to this.

[Mobutu] I might consider the question favorably.

Eritrea

Afewerki Offers Asylum to Somalia's Aidid

EA0710101093 Asmara Voice of the Broad Masses of Eritrea in Tigrinya 1600 GMT 6 Oct 93

[Text] In a statement for the WASHINGTON POST in America, President Isayas Afewerki has noted that unless the United Nations gives up its attempts to capture General Farah Aidid none of its operations in Somalia will succeed. President Isayas Afewerki also noted that because the United Nations had deployed all its forces to capture Gen. Aidid the United Nations had helped the general gather many supporters, while the delivery of humanitarian aid has been hampered. He said the organization had ignored the option of looking for a political solution to the Somali problem.

In his statement to the WASHINGTON POST on 4 October, President Isayas Afewerki said if Aidid is willing to leave Somalia, if the efforts to capture him are abandoned, and if he is not held to account for the UN accusation against him, Eritrea is prepared to give him temporary asylum.

President Isayas Afewerki also noted that he supports America's efforts to solve the Somali problem and to bring about peace in Somalia. He said unless America withdraws its troops from Somalia, the United Nations will be unable to implement its mission successfully.

Somalia

Aidid Aide Says Only 1 U.S. Prisoner; Exchange Proposed

LD0610130793 Rome RAI Televideo Teletext in Italian 1239 GMT 6 Oct 93

[Text] The U.S. pilot held prisoner in Somalia by General Aidid's forces could be exchanged for Somalis in the hands of UN forces. This was stated by Issa Mohamed Siad, head of the Somali National Alliance (SNA) Foreign Relations Department. Issa confirmed that the pilot was wounded in the leg and that he is the only U.S. prisoner in Somali hands.

Journalistic sources report that the bodies of two U.S. soldiers were put on show this morning in Bakarra Market [Mogadishu]. A third body was burned beyond recognition.

Grants Interview on Situation

BR0710115493 Rotterdam ALGEMEEN DAGBLAD in Dutch 7 Oct 93 p 11 [tentative]

[Interview with Issa Mohamed Siad, aid to General Aidid, by Martine Boelsma, in Mogadishu; date not given: "Aidid's Right Hand: We Will Win—Issa Mohamed Siad Foresees U.S. Failure in Somalia"]

[Text] We drive endlessly around the streets of Mogadishu, arriving finally in an alley no more than one kilometer away from the Sahafi Hotel.

"Better safe than sorry," says our guide, Abdi Ashir [as published]. "Professor Issa is one of the last three members of Aidid's committee for foreign affairs who has evaded capture." The barely passable road, like so many others throughout the Somali capital, is full of burned out auto wrecks in which children are playing.

We halt in front of a large iron gateway. Behind a courtyard, enclosed by a high wall, is the hiding place of Issa Mohamed Siad, one of Aidid's closest aides. Not an underground bunker, as you might have expected, but a large, practically unscathed white villa, bathed in sunshine: an ideal target for the Cobra helicopters continually flying overhead.

"Yes, I am afraid. I expect them to come each day and each night. Every time I hear the sound of a helicopter, I think that my time has come," says Issa. His slight build and kind features make him appear extremely friendly, but his glasses conceal a calculating eye. Before the civil war, this man was a professor of literature at Mogadishu University. Now he is one of the main pillars of support for the man who is responsible for the deaths of 12 Americans in recent days and for the imprisonment of at least one U.S. hostage.

[Boelsma] The SNA [Somali National Alliance], Aidid's organization, claims to be holding one hostage, and yet five U.S. servicemen are still missing. What has happened to them?

[Siad] I can assure you that we have only one prisoner of war. The rest are dead or in the hands of other groups.

[Boelsma] Is the SNA making efforts to locate the other missing servicemen?

[Siad] Why do you think that Admiral Howe (UNOSOM [UN Operation in Somalia] commander) refuses to say how many people he is missing. Of course we are trying to locate them.

[Boelsma] Have you seen captured Officer Michael Durant?

[Siad] Only on CNN. I do not know where he is. I only know that individual SNA members have taken him and that they made the videotape.

[Boelsma] Then perhaps you are also aware that the video recording in question, showing the badly burned Durant, has unleashed a wave of indignation among the United States. As did the pictures of rejoicing Somalis dragging the mutilated corpses of U.S. pilots through the town.

[Siad] The wounds suffered by the U.S. hostage were caused by the crash of his helicopter; he has not been mistreated. Durant is better now and is being treated well. With regard to the dead pilot, we regret what

happened. We are against desecrating the dead, but we cannot stem the wrath of the people which has been caused by the appearance of UNOSOM. That can only be achieved by UNOSOM itself, by opening a dialogue with the SNA.

[Boelsma] How can you make accusations against the United Nations while General Aidid is still calling upon people to take up arms on Radio Mogadishu?

[Siad] He is not calling upon people to take up arms, he is urging them to defend themselves.

[Boelsma] What does the SNA plan to do with its hostage?

[Siad] We also have people missing. UNOSOM says that it has captured 24 SNA members. In reality there are 31. We will have to negotiate.

[Boelsma] You want to exchange one man for 31 others?

[Siad] The 31 people in question were forcefully taken hostage by UNOSOM forces merely because they belong to the SNA, not because they had done anything wrong. The American was not taken by force, but was acting criminally. It seems a reasonable exchange to me.

[Boelsma] How can you make this offer when you do not know where Durant is being held?

[Siad] Our supporters are holding him captive somewhere in Mogadishu. We must find the supporters and negotiate with them, so that they can hand over the American to us.

[Boelsma] Then your words would appear to be somewhat premature. It seems as though the SNA does not have the taking of hostages under its control.

[Siad] No comment.

[Boelsma] Are you prepared to allow the Red Cross to visit the prisoner?

[Siad] If the United States wants to know how he is doing then it can contact us. It is now up to the United States to take the first step. We are continually engaging in actions to encourage a rapprochement. Last month, we wrote another letter to Admiral Howe containing a proposal for a cease-fire. He said that he did not want to talk to "bandits," as he calls us.

[Boelsma] Why was the Nigerian UN peacekeeping soldier, who has been held hostage for four weeks already, not included in the proposed exchange of hostages?

[Siad] He is not being held hostage by the SNA, but by citizens of Mogadishu. Even if he was in our hands, he would not have been part of the proposal. He is of no interest to the United States or the United Nations. He comes from the wrong country and he is the wrong color.

[Boelsma] What is your reaction to the deployment of extra troops and materiel by Washington?

[Siad] Mogadishu is a besieged city. The people are being held hostage. Mentally speaking, it does not matter to us if a few more soldiers and helicopters are sent. It may matter physically, but what difference does it make if we are killed today or tomorrow?

[Boelsma] Do you view the pressure being put on President Clinton to withdraw his troops from Mogadishu as a victory for the SNA?

[Siad] Wherever there is fighting, there are only losers. The American who shoots us loses, and so do those who are shot. The problems that we have with UNOSOM and the United Nations—for they are the same thing—can only be solved through dialogue. However, if UNOSOM prefers to drive us away with violence, then I will give the following warning: We will win.

Our urban guerrillas have three year's experience fighting a civil war. The Americans simply do not have the experience.

U.S. Soldier Killed, 13 Wounded in Mortar Attack

AB0710081093 Paris AFP in English 0730 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Excerpts] Mogadishu, 7 Oct (AFP)—A U.S. soldier was killed and three others seriously wounded during a mortar attack by Somali militiamen on Mogadishu Airport late Wednesday [6 October], a U.N. spokesman said Thursday. Major David Stockwell said the latest U.S. casualties occurred when two mortar rounds fell on the airport, triggering the intervention of a U.S. Cobra helicopter in the suspected area. This brought to 20 the number of U.S. servicemen killed in Somalia since the start of the U.N. operation last May. [passage omitted]

Stockwell said a total of 13 U.S. soldiers were wounded during Wednesday's mortar attack, including three seriously who were to be flown to Germany Thursday. All the U.S. casualties were members of the 1,500-strong U.S. Quick Reaction Force which is backing the U.N. contingent here. [passage omitted]

Meanwhile delegates from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were expected to visit a U.S. helicopter pilot captured by Aidid loyalists during Sunday's firefight by the end of the week, a U.N. spokesman said Wednesday. "The ICRC has not yet seen Chief Warrant Officer Michael Durant, the Black Hawk helicopter pilot who's being held hostage by Aidid's militia," deputy United Nations military spokesman Captain Tim McDavitt announced. "However, I understand that they have requested a visit and anticipate that it will occur in the next couple of days."

A senior aide to Aidid said Wednesday that 357 Somalis had died Sunday, with 764 left injured. The aide, Issa Mohamed Siad, suggested that Durant could be swapped for all Somalis detained by United Nations forces. But the head of U.N. peacekeeping operations, Kofi Annan, ruled out such a deal.

President Clarifies Speech to Parliament

EA0710111593 (Clandestine) Radio Hargeysa Voice of the Republic of Somaliland in Somali 1200 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Text] A statement from the office of Somaliland President Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal says it appears that part of the president's speech at a session of Parliament was wrongly interpreted. In the statement, President Egal denied saying that the Koranic verse which specifies legal punishment for thieves is out of date. President Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal also vehemently denied saying that the Koranic verse on slander and the punishment set for it was out of date. President Egal's statement said the Islamic religion is eternal and will be applicable at all times and situations, adding that his statement to Parliament was based on the Islamic religion as our way of life. Finally, President Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal's statement concluded by calling on all to avoid misinforming the public or misinterpreting on their behalf.

Interior Minister Outlines Future Plans for Country

EA0610215193 (Clandestine) Radio Hargeysa Voice of the Republic of Somaliland in Somali 1200 GMT 28 Sep 93

[Text] The interior minister of the Republic of Somaliland, Mr. Musa Bihi Abdi, told Radio Hargeysa's reporter this morning that the ministry's plans for the next two years were to establish peace and stability in the country's interior. The Interior Ministry would also give priority to district and regional administrations, the formation of a national police force, the general welfare of field workers and farmers, the linking of communities, the direction of the nation's internal policies and the government administration, and the creation of mechanisms to contain disasters. The minister added that the government would establish regional and district administrations and put all bylaws in place to ensure that each area was linked all the other areas.

On the issue of disarmament, the minister said the government had formed a special force, and that all arms in the hands of civilians would be surrendered and kept in specially prepared areas. National forces would be kept busy with the country's development. He discussed the Mandheera Institute, saying it was a national youth center where rations for national forces were stored for distribution.

'Week of Peace' Conference Opens; Official Comments

EA3009201093 Mogadishu Voice of the Somali Republic in Somali 1100 GMT 30 Sep 93

[Text] The Somali communities' conference for the week of peace today officially opened at the former CID headquarters, Mogadishu. The conference, which opened at 11 am, will last two days, and leaders of organizations, community leaders, and distinguished

guests from all sections of Somali society are participating. Speaking on behalf of Somali communities, Mr. Hussein Shaykh Ahmed Qadareh, the chairman of the conference, read out a joint appeal in which they expressed their political stand on matters of peace and social matters.

Speaking on behalf of the chairmen of the Somali communities, chiefs, religious leaders, peace-seekers and intellectuals, Mr. Hussein Shaykh Ahmed Qadareh sent condolences to Dr. Butrus Butrus-Ghali, the UN secretary general, Admiral Jonathan Howe, the UN special envoy to Somalia, and to the governments and families of those who lost their lives in the heinous attacks masterminded by individuals with vested interests.

Mr. Qadareh went on to say that the Somali people recognized and were thankful for the international rescue mission spearheaded by the United Nations in Somalia in order to implement the UN resolutions, adding that the communities would like to admit that they were satisfied with the presence of the United Nations Operation Somalia-II [UNOSOM-II] troops in Somalia and would like to pledge their unreserved support for the troops in the discharge of their duties of saving the Somali nation.

He made it clear that having the interests of their people at heart, the social leaders wanted to take advantage of the international mission with a view to overcoming the multifaceted problems that bedevilled the Somali people. In this regard, he proposed the following points: That the UNOSOM-II troops and relief workers be made available throughout the country's regions so that peaceful desires could be realized; that general disarmament should be implemented throughout Somalia because this is the key to the country's peace; that investigations should be made and immediate action be taken against those relief agencies which have offended the Somali people in regard to relief aid donated by the world for starving people or those affected by the war and its resultant problems; that rebuilding the country, which the people eagerly await, should be started because the civil wars have ended, that the implementation of the remaining Addis Ababa agreement be completed and the Somali nation be restored before the expiry of the UNOSOM-II program.

Speaking on the views of the Somali community leaders regarding the Italian Government, Mr. Hussein Shaykh Ahmed Qadareh said Italy had a long relationship with Somalia, especially in the spheres of development and relief programs, and relations between the two peoples. However, beginning with Siad Barre's rule there was change in Italy's political relationship with the Somali people. When there was a popular uprising against dictator Siad Barre, Italy strongly condemned Somali people's desires. During the civil wars in the country foreign governments and international relief organizations assisted the Somali people, but the Italian Government did not play the role which the Somali people expected from it. The Italian Government again shirked

its role when the world came to save the Somali people from starvation and problems.

The Italian Government troops came to Somalia as part of the UNOSOM-II force but they became an obstacle to the efforts to assist the Somali people and this caused a great setback in the implementation of the UNOSOM programs.

Mr. Hussein Shaykh Ahmed Qadareh, speaking on behalf of the Somali community leaders, said that the Somali people greatly respected the historic relations between the two countries and were eagerly waiting for the Italian Government to play its part in the UNOSOM programs aimed at saving the Somali people. He called on the Italian Government to correct its political stand regarding UNOSOM decisions and to desist from interfering in Somalia's internal affairs.

In conclusion, Mr. Hussein Shaykh Ahmed Qadareh made an appeal to the Somali people, saying that Somali unity is sacred. In the name of the people he called on the Somali National Alliance to perform their obligations regarding the Somali people's unity and peace, saying that a joint effort should be made to implement the

Addis Ababa agreement which stipulated the duties of the four committees, namely the cease-fire committee, the expropriated property committee, the charter committee, and the reconstruction committee, so that the Somali people could jointly preserve their interests and dignity. He said it should be recognized that the Somali people were obliged to solve their problems.

Somaliland Council Meets, Considers UNOSOM-II Reply

EA0610190893 (Clandestine) Radio Hargeysa Voice of the Republic of Somaliland in Somali 1200 GMT 4 Oct 93

[Text] An ordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers of Somaliland was held today [4 October] at the presidency of Somaliland, Hargeysa, chaired by the vice president of Somaliland, Abdirahman aw Ali Farah. The Council of Ministers heard details of UNOSOM-II's reply to the government of Somliland's earlier stance. The government of Somaliland was satisfied with the reply from UNOSOM-II's top leadership. The report adds that the Council of Ministers discussed other items on its agenda in addition to UNOSOM-II's reply.

Mandela Confident of Portuguese Investment in Country

MB0610171893 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1630 GMT 6 Oct 93

[By David Greybe]

[Text] Lisbon Oct 6 SAPA—The Portuguese Government and business community have given assurances they will assist South Africa, African National Congress [ANC] President Nelson Mandela said in Lisbon on Wednesday. "The support we have been given is exactly as we asked," Mr Mandela told an international news conference at the end of a two-day trip to Portugal. He described his first visit to the country as an overwhelming success.

Mr Mandela announced that the Portuguese Government would assist with the training of civil servants and in the field of academia, among other things.

At a meeting on Wednesday morning the influential Portuguese/South African Chamber of Commerce "gave an assurance we can expect a very quick business response", said Mr Mandela. "I have no doubt they are going to invest in our country in large amounts."

He said he had dealt with the issue of violence in his talks with government and the business community, but said he was confident it was only a "passing phase".

The ANC leader also announced he would address a public rally for Portuguese South Africans before the end of October in Johannesburg. He was confident he would be able to deal with any misgivings they had about an ANC-led government.

It was "entirely reasonable" that black South Africans had negative perceptions about the large Portuguese community because the country's government had always been dominated by whites. There was also no visible Portuguese presence in the democratic process.

South Africa has an estimated 600,000-strong Portuguese community.

However, Mr Mandela said he had no doubt that after he had addressed Portuguese people in Johannesburg "all negative feelings (by blacks) will disappear".

During his stay, Mr Mandela met top government officials, including President Mario Soares, Prime Minister Cavaco Silva, Foreign Minister Durao Barroso and cabinet ministers. Mr Mandela leaves for Brussels on Wednesday night, where he will spend three days as part of a European tour.

Holds News Conference

LD0610201293 Lisbon Radio Renascenca in Portuguese to Europe 1700 GMT 6 Oct 93

[Report on news conference given by ANC President Nelson Mandela in Lisbon on 6 October by correspondent Anabela Gois; Mandela speaks in English, with superimposed Portuguese translation]

[Excerpts] De Klerk is partly to blame for the violence in South Africa: The accusation was made in Lisbon this afternoon by Nelson Mandela who is concluding an official visit to Portugal. [passage omitted] Anabela Gois reports:

[Gois] The Portuguese [in South Africa], the minorities, the Whites, have nothing to fear from an ANC [African National Congress] government. This assurance repeatedly given by Nelson Mandela throughout his stay in Portugal was reiterated again today at the news conference that concluded the visit. He reiterated that without the support of the White community it will be impossible to democratize the country and end apartheid. He also went so far as to accuse President de Klerk of to some extent diverting the Whites from this process. He also called the South African head of state to account over the violence that continues to prevail in the country. Behind the instability are, first and foremost, the security forces, and President de Klerk refuses to accept this and bring the situation to an end, Mandela stated.

[Mandela] What we are demanding is joint control of the security forces, and we have succeeded in creating a structure that is going to take over that control in the face of opposition from De Klerk. They are resisting the establishment of joint control because they know what is going to happen when we have joint control; we are going to put an end to this violence. But even then our control of violence will be relative. We will only be able to stop violence when we are in government.

[Gois] The ANC leader also said that without a true climate of confidence there will be no investment and political reforms will be unable to succeed. This instability will have repercussions in the whole of southern Africa.

On the subject of Angola, Mandela said he has no personal friendship ties with either leader, that peace is all he is interested in, and that he hopes to be able soon to witness a meeting between Jonas Savimbi and Jose Eduardo dos Santos. [passage omitted]

Leaves Portugal; 'Mission Accomplished'

LD0610213093 Lisbon RTP Internacional Television in Portuguese 1905 GMT 6 Oct 93

[Excerpts] On leaving Portugal today, Nelson Mandela said that he carries with him a feeling of mission accomplished. The ANC leader promised to do his utmost to change the South African blacks' negative perception of the Portuguese. Today Mandela signed a cooperation agreement with Portugal. Vitor Goncalves reports:

[Goncalves] The visit could not have gone better. Of his two-day stay in Lisbon Mandela said he has been given all he asked for. On the government's behalf, [Portuguese Foreign Minister] Durao Barroso offered him our country's solidarity, plus an agreement under which the Portuguese Government will assist in the training of ANC cadres:

[Begin Barroso recording] We have agreed to start cooperation programs immediately in the area of training technicians, academic training, and of cadres in public administration and other spheres of activity. [end recording]

[Goncalves] [passage omitted] Mandela said that without a strong economy, the change to a democratic and multiracial South Africa will be all the harder. He also gave advice toward Portuguese businessmen:

[Begin Mandela recording in English with superimposed Portuguese translation] By investing in South Africa and backing the democratic process, the international community will be helping not just South Africa, but the peoples of the entire region. [end recording]

[Goncalves] The hardest part will be convincing the Portuguese community in South Africa of the ANC's good intentions. The Portuguese have always been traditional allies of conservative governments and the blacks mistrust them strongly. Mandela says that dialogue is the all-important thing, and he is wasting no time, with a meeting with the Portuguese of Johannesburg already scheduled for the end of this month. [passage omitted]

Hani Murder Trial Begins 4 Oct Amid Tight Security

MB0310074793 Johannesburg SAPA in English 0601 GMT 3 Oct 93

[By Adrienne Carlisle]

[Text] Johannesburg Oct 3 SAPA—The Chris Hani murder trial begins in earnest on Monday morning with extraordinary crowd control measures inside and outside the Rand Supreme Court. Leading Conservative Party politician Clive Derby-Lewis, his wife Gaye, and Polish immigrant Janusz Walus are facing charges of murdering the Communist Party leader, conspiracy to commit murder and the illegal possession of arms and ammunition.

According to a summary of facts attached to the indictment, in February this year Mr. Derby-Lewis obtained the 9mm Z88 pistol allegedly used to shoot Mr. Hani to death outside his Dawn Park, Boksburg, home on April 10.

Later in the same month, said the summary, Mr. Derby-Lewis had a silencer fitted to the gun in Cape Town and was given five sub sonic 9mm cartridges by the gunsmith.

Early on the morning of April 10, the day of the assassination, Walus is alleged to have purchased a box with 25 9mm cartridges from a licensed firearm dealer in Johannesburg.

At 10am the SA Communist Party leader was shot four times outside his home. He died on the scene.

Following the descriptions by a witness, police arrested Walus and a 9mm Z88 pistol, ballistically linked to the murder, was found in his possession. "This was the same firearm to which accused 2 (Mr. Derby-Lewis) had a silencer fitted in Cape Town," said the summary.

Walus was also found to have blood on his clothing which tests proved was of the same blood type as Mr. Hani's.

The summary said that in January Mrs. Derby-Lewis allegedly asked an acquaintance, a Mr. Kemp, to provide her with the personal details, including the addresses, of nine people, including Mr. Hani.

According to an annexure attached to the indictment, the "list" also included ANC [African National Congress] President Nelson Mandela, ANC NEC [National Executive Committee] member Mac Maharaj, SACP [South African Communist Party] National Chairman Joe Slovo, BEELD journalist Karen Brynard, BEELD political correspondent Tim du Plessis, SUNDAY TIMES editor Ken Owen, Foreign Affairs Minister Pik Botha, and Goldstone Commission Chairman Mr. Justice Richard Goldstone.

Mr. and Mrs. Derby-Lewis and Walus were formally charged with the murder of Mr. Hani in the Boksburg magistrate's court in May, this year.

Only Mrs. Derby-Lewis was released on bail.

Extraordinary measures concerning the media and crowd control are being taken throughout the trial.

A large contingent of police will monitor proceedings outside the Rand Supreme Court where a crowd including friends, family and compatriots of the murdered Communist Party leader and possibly rightwing supporters of the Derby-Lewis couple and Walus are expected to gather. "We will be there monitoring the situation and will take action against unruly elements if necessary," was the stern warning issued by SA Police Liaison Officer Maj Eugene Opperman.

Journalists will not be allowed into the main building without special accreditation, and only one-third of the courtroom seating will be reserved for the media.

The remainder of the seating is being reserved for families of the accused, the complainants and the public.

Transvaal Judge President Mr. C F Eloff is presiding at the trial.

Defendants Plead Not Guilty

MB0410124893 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1159 GMT 4 Oct 93

[By Adrienne Carlisle]

[Text] Johannesburg Oct 4 SAPA—The three rightwingers accused of murdering the SA Communist Party leader Chris Hani, conspiracy to commit murder and the illegal possession of arms and ammunition pleaded not guilty on all counts in the Rand Supreme Court on Monday.

Conservative Party politician Clive Derby-Lewis, his wife, Gaye, and the man accused of pulling the trigger, Polish immigrant Janusz Waluz, entered a plea of not guilty on all counts when the trial began on Monday morning.

Two eye witnesses gave their account of what happened on April 10, the day Mr. Hani was shot to death in the driveway of his dawn park, Boksburg, home.

Mr. Michael Buchanan, who lives in the house diagonally opposite the Hani residence, pointed out Waluz, who was sitting in the courtroom, as the man he had seen drive away from the scene after the shooting.

Mr. Buchanan also identified Waluz in an ID parade of 10 men at the Benoni Brixton and robbery headquarters, the day after Mr. Hani was shot. He said on April 10, he had heard shots nearby and had grabbed his firearm before rushing outside. While still at his front door, he had seen a red hatchback car driving slowly past and he had taken note of what the driver looked like because the timing of the shots and the screaming "definitely" indicated a "connection".

Asked by Waluz's legal representative Mr. Eben Jordaan if it was not possible he had made a mistake, he replied: "There was no mistaking the identification of the man. I saw his left profile clearly as he drove past."

Mr. Buchanan said he had rushed to the gate and from there had seen Mr. Hani lying in his driveway while his daughter stood nearby screaming. He had rushed to the scene and had taken the child away before returning to his house and getting rope to cordon off the driveway to prevent spectators from getting too close to the scene.

Another witness, Mrs. Margaretha Harmse, said she was driving past Mr. Hani's home when she noticed a white man standing in a "firing position" with an object she assumed was a gun pointed at someone else.

She had heard two shots and had slowed down. She then saw the white man bend over Mr. Hani's body and fire two more shots. She said she had not accelerated because it had felt as though she was watching a film. "I could not believe my eyes."

She had looked in her rearview mirror as she drove slowly away and had seen a man in a red Ford Laser reverse and slowly drive away from Mr. Hani's home. She had memorised the number plate, rushed to her nearby home and written it down. She then phoned the police and told them a man had been shot at Mr. Hani's home and had given them the car's registration number.

The trial continues.

Paper Criticizes U.S. Training of Mandela's Bodyguards

MB0610154793 Pretoria DIE AFRIKANER in Afrikaans 24-30 Sep 93 p 5

[Text] The undisguised interference by the United States in South Africa's domestic affairs and its blatant favoritism in politics has taken on a new dimension. The United States has pledged to train Nelson Mandela's bodyguards. The motive for this unprovoked interference is ostensibly the threat that the IFP [Inkatha Freedom Party] poses for the ANC [African National Congress]. There is even talk about threats from "right-wing extremists."

The degree of U.S. assistance is demonstrated by the fact that President Clinton has personally indicated that the State Department's Bureau for Diplomatic Security has accepted responsibility for the "secret training" of a small group of Mandela's bodyguards. The extortion behind this move is evident from the admission by U.S. authorities that it is a highly exceptional situation to train bodyguards protecting someone who does not have the status of head of state. It has also been said that Mandela's security is of high priority to the United States in light of possible solutions to South Africa's racial problems.

This turnaround in attitude also reflects a turnaround in U.S. policy, as that country initially regarded the ANC as a terrorist organization but is now prepared to grant it official sanction.

The United States has also changed its attitude toward Chief Buthelezi, whom it had always held in high esteem. He is now the victim of prejudice, rejected in favor of Mandela. The United States is obviously aware of the civil war between the ANC and the IFP, and the training of Mandela's bodyguards has to be seen in that context.

The United States used to train bodyguards to protect heads of friendly states against terrorists. It is ironic that bodyguards of a terrorist organization are now being trained to attack this country's lawful authority. It is proof of the worst imaginable form of intervention in a sovereign country's affairs. It is beyond comprehension that such a situation could be allowed by a head of state who has self-respect.

Viljoen Urged To Avoid Intimidation by Conservatives

MB0610112693 Johannesburg RAPPORT in Afrikaans 3 Oct 93 p 3

[Article by former Conservative Party member and MP for Overvaal Koos van der Merwe]

[Text] The appearance of the generals on the right-wing political scene has given the Conservative Party [CP] leaders undeserved new oxygen.

Concerned whites are once again enthusiastically streaming in their numbers to Afrikaner National Front

gatherings; not to go and listen to the CP, but rather to hear which concrete plans the generals have for ensuring the Afrikaner a place in the sun.

Prominent CP members admit their organization was down and out. Then came the welcome rescue: The generals.

With that, the right-wing body changed its head. CP leaders were replaced by General Constand Viljoen as head.

Plan

The fact that Gen. Viljoen stepped forward with a plan and was prepared to bravely debate his plan with the ANC [African National Congress] and the government explains why he became the head of the body.

There can be no doubt today that Gen. Viljoen enjoys more esteem and support than CP leader Ferdi Hartzenberg. In fact, RAPPORT's recent opinion poll indicates that the general enjoys more support than Dr. Hartzenberg and Eugene Terreblanche combined.

CP leaders do not want to accept that due to the fundamentally changed South Africa we are compelled to search for a solution other than apartheid. The generals accept this reality.

CP supporters, the body, have for a while begun to sense that the CP did not have a workable plan. CP rhetoric now revolves around war talk, threats, and theories with hardly anything concrete and constructive.

The question now is whether Gen. Viljoen realizes—and many disenchanted National Party members also—that he is the new head of the right-wing body.

Truth

The moment of truth is fast approaching for three groups in right-wing ranks:

—Dr. Ferdi Hartzenberg and his conservative colleagues are waging a bitter fight to win back the right-wing body and thereby trying to save their own political lives. That is why they are trying to intimidate and smother Gen. Viljoen's initiatives.

A CP MP recently said the "little general's" wings will get clipped. That process is apparently under way, especially since the positive publicity about Gen. Viljoen after he held talks with the ANC and the government.

Dr. Hartzenberg is being supported by a strong conservative core, such as former HNP [Reformed National Party] members Joseph Chirole and Louis Stofberg, and also quasi-HNP's such as Schalk Pienaar, Jurg Prinsloo, Andrew Gerber, Jan Hoon, and Abrie Oosthuizen.

—The realists within the CP caucus—those who all along knew that the CP was without a plan and were dragging the organization into chaos—are yearning for a way out and Gen. Viljoen is their only savior. Among them is Thomas Langle, Daan van der Merwe, Fanie Jacobs, Piet Gous, Carl Werth, and

others. This group will fit in with the generals. When Gen. Viljoen stiffens his back, they will fall in behind him. This will isolate the CP's conservative wing.

—Gen. Viljoen can no longer avoid confrontation with the CP's conservative wing. It is merely a question of when.

Basic Problems

He has two basic problems with the conservative CP wing. Firstly, he and they represent two irreconcilable political philosophies. Gen. Viljoen realizes that a state within a federation is the best practical thing for the Afrikaner and that racism is dead. Juxtaposed to this is the continuing demand by conservatives for a sovereign independent nation state in which non-Afrikaners will be second class citizens.

Gen. Viljoen's second problem with the conservative CP's is that their racist policy places undue pressure on the Cosag [Concerned South Africans Group] group, thereby weakening Gen. Viljoen's bargaining capabilities at the negotiations with the ANC and the government. Cosag could never grow to its full potential as long as its one partner's—the CP—policy is racist.

When Cosag is able to really stand united, it will be too strong to be ignored and a new South Africa will not come about without its consent. The ANC and the government can simply not ignore the vast numbers of Zulus, Tswanas, Afrikaners, and others in the Cosag group.

Handcuffs

Gen. Viljoen realizes the handcuffs the conservative CP wing is slamming on his wrists. There can no longer be a middle path for him, and his leadership will soon be tested. The adamant racists in the CP will have to change or else be kicked out.

What must happen now is for Gen. Viljoen to realize that he is the head of the body and that he has to confront with confidence conservative CP's. He must not allow himself to be intimidated. He must continue to negotiate with the ANC and the government and thereby strengthen Cosag. He must search for solutions and enforce them.

Negotiators Reach Consensus on Appointment of Ombudsman

MB0610175793 Johannesburg Radio South Africa Network in English 1600 GMT 6 Oct 93

[Text] Consensus has been reached in the Negotiating Council at Kempton Park on proposals that there should be an ombudsman under the new constitution to guard against government maladministration. In terms of the proposal, the ombudsman will be a highly qualified legal expert whose full-time task will be to ensure that clean administration is maintained. Acting either on his own initiative or on the grounds of complaints submitted to his office, he will be empowered to investigate charges of

maladministration or abuse of authority and make recommendations to correct the situation.

Afrikaner Front, CP Disagree on Continuing Negotiations

MB0610180493 Johannesburg SABC TV 1 Network in English 1600 GMT 6 Oct 93

[Text] Afrikaner Volksfront [National Front] leader General Constand Viljoen says the right political spectrum must complete bilateral negotiations with the government and the ANC [African National Congress] to ensure a future for Afrikaners. Ahead of tomorrow's summit of the Concerned South Africans Group, however, there appears to be disagreement on the subject between the Volksfront and the Conservative Party [CP]. Gary Alfonso of our political staff spoke to the leaders of the two parties:

[Begin recording] [Viljoen] The Council will then have to decide. As far as myself is concerned, I will strongly recommend that they do complete the talks, because the effect of a failure on the demands of the Afrikaner is so serious that I deem it very necessary for us to explore all the possible ways to find a peaceful solution, and that's what we'll do.

[CP leader Ferdie Hartzenberg, in Afrikaans] The proposal that negotiations be suspended was put forward by Gen. Viljoen, so there is no difference on the issue of negotiations as far as the Volksfront and the CP is concerned. [end recording]

Four Reported Dead in Natal Violence

MB0710092193 Johannesburg SAPA in English 0806 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Durban Oct 7 SAPA—Violence claimed at least four lives in Natal on Wednesday, police said. SA Police spokesman Maj Bala Naidoo said Mr T Msomi was fatally shot and his wife, Mrs S Msomi, wounded in an attack on their home in the Macekane area of Mtunzini on the Natal North Coast.

The kwaZulu Police said a 30-year-old man was also shot on Wednesday afternoon in the Obivane area of Umbumbulu on the South Coast.

In kwaMashu, north of Durban, the bodies of two men were found in T Section at 10pm on Wednesday night. Both bodies had gunshot wounds.

South African Press Review for 7 Oct

MB0710122593

[Editorial Report]

THE STAR

Free Vote For All—"There are times In this transition phase when it seems there are always more hurdles ahead," an editoail in Johannesburg THE STAR in

English on 7 October on page 12 notes. This week it "is whether all voters will be in possession of valid identity documents by April 27." The ANC's [African National Congress] Terror Lekota "not surprisingly, accused the government of being deliberately tardy." "The central issue is, however, whether the elections will be deemed free and fair. This implies not only that all eligible people should be able to cast a ballot, but that they will be able to do so free of intimidation." "Lekota is fully justified in demanding that the government, in this case administratiely, sees to it that the playing field is levelled. But his party has a major responsibility too: ensuring especially that township voting is free of intimidation."

BUSINESS DAY

Positive Thoughts—"The recession is over, says SACOB [South African Chamber of Business] director-general Raymond Parsons. Some people might not have noticed, but his brave statement will help spur the long-awaited recovery," an editorial in Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English on 7 October on page 4 states. However, as Parson's warned, "the economy is still extremely vulnerable, especially to political setbacks and the violence which has kept capital investment on hold for so long. Foreign investment is far from assured while these factors are still unresolved." As for socioeconomic projects, "spelled out in so many scenario plans, also have a role to play in the early stages of recovery." In these job-creating programs "it is essential that the politicians work together, and show the same responsible approach they were able to present to the international audience last month despite their ideological differences."

SOWETAN

Petrol Price Increase—"The pre-election antics of politicians would be quite hilarious if the matter were not so serious. The days are gone, it seems, when MP's for instance blithely raised prices and passed tyrannical acts without turning a hair," an editorial in Johannesburg SOWETAN in English on 7 October on page 5 notes. "It is quite historic to see the minister of mineral and energy affairs, Mr George Bartlett, under seige, even from his own colleagues, for doing something that used to be par for the course." "The National Party realises, after the horse has bolted, alas, that the price hile has infuriated people from places as disparate as Soweto and Pietersburg. They are afraid that their stocks, which are already pretty low, will fall precipately if there is mass action against the petrol price increase. It is probably a good lesson not only for them but we hope for other political leaders."

*** Cyril Ramaphosa: Personality, Career Profiled**

93AF0825A Cape Town DIE SUID-AFRIKAAN in Afrikaans Aug/Sep 93 pp 22, 24-25

[Article by Elsabe Wessels: "Cyril Ramaphosa—A Virtuoso With Guts and a Bite"]

[Text] *The charming and somewhat arrogant Cyril Ramaphosa is a negotiator who pushes back the boundaries.*

Although he is not hesitant in giving his opponents a malicious jab, he is nonetheless someone who would pull a fishhook out of your finger..

A virtuoso negotiator is surely the best description that can be given to Cyril Ramaphosa. His inexhaustible stamina in taking care of business and his exceptional technical ability make him a formidable opponent. Whether it is a critical debate in the maelstrom of constitutional negotiations or along a fishing stream—Ramaphosa has an innate drive to win the round. He earned his fame as a negotiator long before the talent he displayed at the World Trade Center placed him in the spotlight. While most of the politicians were plunged into the process as novices at negotiation, for him it was familiar territory. In the 1980's, he had the mining companies' most capable negotiators at their wits' end and gave them a hard time of it with his unconventional tactics. As the leader of the biggest miners' strike that the country had seen to date, he pushed back the boundaries of every known negotiating technique.

Now, nearly 10 years later, he heads the ANC's [African National Congress] negotiating team with the same guts and the same capacity for unexpected moves and sudden acrimony. It is this latter character trait in particular that make his opponents tread softly. Ask anyone who has come into closer contact with him in recent years and without exception they will say that they would prefer not to be on the other side of the table. Cool, calm, logical, well-spoken, with a considerable leavening of charm and a bit of arrogance—a team player. This is the impression that Ramaphosa makes. A man who attacks the ball well but with a mean tendency to attack the man as well.

The theatrics that occurred on the evening of 27 May during a special session of the Negotiating Council when Hernus Kriel, minister of law and order, was summoned before the council, sticks in one's memory. Prior to the beginning of the session, Ramaphosa welcomed Kriel to the council chamber with a broad and theatrical smile. There was shuffling of papers and jokes were exchanged. A few minutes later, Ramaphosa launched—in scathing language—a humiliating attack upon Kriel and demanded his head. Many political opponents, including Roelf Meyer, with whom Ramaphosa has established a good negotiating rapport, have had to suffer from his sharp tongue—the dark side of a man who does not like to lose.

Ramaphosa was born on 17 November 1952 in Johannesburg and grew up in Soweto. His father, the son of a mineworker, was a policeman. From an early age, the young Matamela Cyril Ramaphosa wanted to become an attorney. "I thought I would become an attorney, earn a lot of money, lead a comfortable existence, and drive around in a Mercedes."

But apartheid and Soweto's dusty streets made him politically conscious. An incident from his youth that has stayed with him occurred one morning when he was on his way to school: He was booted out of the road by a white soldier. That was 1960, after Sharpeville and

during the nationwide state of emergency. He did not cry. He looked the soldier in the eye, picked up his bookbag, and continued on to school. That noon at home, he sought an answer for his humiliation from his mother. "For years afterward I continued to harbor deep bitterness towards white people for that day's events," Ramaphosa recalls decades later.

After graduation, he went to Turfloop in 1972 where he enrolled to study for a baccalaureate law degree. Before long, he found himself at odds with the Security Police. That was the heyday of Black Consciousness politics on black campuses. Ramaphosa, under the influence of Steve Biko, became involved in the South African Students Organization (SASO). He was also the chairman of the Student Christian Movement on campus. His political activities came to the attention of the Security Police. In 1974, he and other students celebrated the seizure of power by Samora Machel's Frelimo [Mozambique Liberation Front] by arranging a mass meeting. The result of that was 11 months detention without a hearing. Afterwards, Ramaphosa always made a point of saying that that time in prison did not make him bitter. "I feel sorry for them. They will never be able to stop the tide of black people who are fighting for their rights. I look at the white man and see that he is suffering too because he is oppressing the black man. He is not free. It is futile to attempt to stop the black liberation struggle. My detention only more strongly motivated me to strive for justice."

I Grew Up in a Household That Believes in Justice

He was banned from Turfloop following his release and he devoted his energy to the Black People's Convention (BPC) and joined a law firm in Johannesburg as an apprentice legal clerk. (SASO and the BPC were outlawed in 1977 following the death of Steve Biko.) In 1976, Soweto's year of youth protests, the 24-year-old Ramaphosa again brought the wrath of the security forces upon himself. He was locked up in John Vorster Square Prison for six months to cool down. The result was that he completed his period as an apprentice legal clerk and received his baccalaureate law degree from UNISA [University of South Africa]. The glitter of the legal profession quickly faded. As an apprentice legal clerk, he realized early on that his sense of justice would have to take second place to the commercial side of the legal profession. He began to feel like a mercenary and he wanted to be in a profession where he could feel he was making a contribution to the community. "I grew up in a household that believed in justice and that influenced me greatly," says Ramaphosa.

It was this search for a sense of justice that led him to the miners. In 1981, he joined the legal department of the Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA). A year later, Ramaphosa undertook a recruitment campaign for a new mineworkers union. The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) was founded in August 1982 and Ramaphosa was appointed its general-secretary in December of that year.

Ramaphosa tackled his work with a passion. The labor union that had represented 6,000 mineworkers at eight mines at the time of its founding had a membership of over 30,000 by 1986—the country's largest labor union. His influence among the mineworkers forced the Chamber of Mines to bargain with the as-yet-unregistered labor union. In 1984, he led the first legal strike by black mineworkers and guided the labor union—barely three years old at the time—through its baptism of fire. The first campaign was decided in favor of the mineworkers. Ramaphosa was immediately described as a "crafty and tactical" negotiator.

In August 1987, the union was plunged into its greatest crisis when Ramaphosa assumed leadership of one of the country's most massive strikes. Approximately 30,000 mineworkers at 40 gold and coal mines stopped work in protest against a stalemate in wage negotiations. It was make or break for both Ramaphosa and the labor union. For 21 days altogether the union and the Chamber of Mines exhausted each other. Journalists remember how Ramaphosa stayed in his office day and night to avert any potential crisis. Dog-tired [sic], he sometimes just fell asleep there on the floor of his office in Johannesburg's Wanderer Street. In the end, the strikers went back to work without their demands having been met.

Ramaphosa's critics believed that he had overplayed his hand and had caused irreparable harm to the union. His calculated risk had failed. Thousands of mineworkers lost their jobs. The fact that he was prepared to risk everything in order to draw attention to the "feudal" conditions in the mines, however, is characteristic of Ramaphosa. He is fearless in the pursuit of his convictions. It is this fearlessness that some months later made him the recipient of the first Olaf Palme Peace Prize—for his contribution to the ending of apartheid.

Ramaphosa's acerbity during wage negotiations in the 1980's is legendary. "Treacherous, heartless, and cowardly," he snarled at Anglo-American's Bobby Godsell in the heat of argument. Despite the insults, Godsell praised Ramaphosa. "I really respect the man's intellect, his energy, and his leadership ability." The two are friends today. Ramaphosa played a decisive role in the growth of the National Union of Mineworkers—the first black labor union formally recognized by the Chamber of Mines. Up through 1982, black mineworkers had no bargaining power. Ramaphosa never regarded the union as his final destination—not because he himself had higher aspirations—but because he believes that a mineworker should fill the role. "Although I can identify with mineworkers, the most important attribute for union leadership is the ability to represent the workers' aspirations. The advice of a lawyer or other expert can always be bought."

It was clear from the beginning that the union would have a strong political agenda. By forging ties to international labor union movements such as Arthur Scargil's National Union of Mineworkers in London, the union played an important role in the maintenance of sanctions and also ensured that any action by NUM would be defended in the

international arena. NUM played a leading role in the founding of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). For four years Ramaphosa worked behind the scenes towards the founding of a super-federation and eventually was in charge of the arrangements for a giant meeting at which it was constituted in Durban in 1985. COSATU's political agenda was clearly spelled out. In March 1986, Ramaphosa was one of six COSATU representatives who went to meet the ANC in Lusaka.

The state of emergency was declared two months later. While the security forces hunted political activists, Ramaphosa and NUM president James Motlatsi went abroad, where they used a British National Union of Mineworkers conference to draw widespread attention to the political conditions in the country. There were calls for international solidarity and sanctions and disinvestment was encouraged. The Ramaphosa-factor was further strengthened in 1987 with the creation of the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM). The United Democratic Front [UDF] and COSATU came all the more forcefully to the fore as a united front against apartheid. It was during this period that Ramaphosa finally established himself as one of the most formidable and influential black leaders in the country. As one of the leading figures in the MDM, Ramaphosa and his fellow-union leaders were responsible for union members taking up the political struggle. Political support for the Freedom Charter was sought among labor union members.

Ramaphosa began to act in the political area with greater and greater confidence. He found himself at the forefront of the Soweto People's Delegation (SPD) in 1989. He was a founding member of the SPD in 1986 when the first negotiations with the province were entered into for the purpose of ending the rent strike and restoring services. Up through 1991, Ramaphosa brought all his negotiating talent to bear in his dealings with the Transvaal Provincial Administration and ESCOM [Electricity Supply Commission]. The negotiations were merciless. Ramaphosa dug in his heels. The result was that overdue rent and utility bills amounting to 570 million South African rands were to be written off and the Johannesburg Metropolitan Chamber was created—something that finally plunged local government in the broad negotiation process.

With the release of the first of the veteran political prisoners two years later, Ramaphosa was again in the spotlight. As the convener of the welcoming committee that planned and managed the leaders' homecoming, good mutual bonds [sic] developed between him and the Robben Islanders. In the last few months prior to Mandela's release, Ramaphosa was included in the select group of black leaders who were allowed to speak to him via telephone in Victor Verster Prison. When Mandela walked out of Victor Verster Prison on Sunday, 11 February 1990, Ramaphosa was at his side. Hours later, when Mandela made his first speech from the balcony of Cape Town City Hall, Ramaphosa held the microphone.

Since seizing the important post of ANC secretary-general as an outsider from under the noses of important ANC exiles, Ramaphosa has grown in stature. Elements of the MDM lobbied hard and did much organizational work to establish Ramaphosa's leadership at the ANC's first national conference in July 1991. This was a tactical move to put the negotiating process in "new" hands. The view existed that the foreign leadership that had begun the negotiating process was being led around by the nose by the South African government. The outcome was that the 38-year-old Ramaphosa was carried on participants' shoulders to the podium.

Power Sharing Was More Than a Compromise—It Was an Ideological Leap In Thinking

Last year, Ramaphosa again undertook a calculated risk and once again his head could have rolled. This was the daring enterprise of accepting power sharing and explaining it to the ANC's constituents. Power sharing was more than a compromise—it was an ideological leap in thinking. Ramaphosa realized that blood money had to be paid in order to give the negotiating process a final push. For him and his fellow-negotiators, it was a bitter pill to swallow; pragmatic as he is, however, he took the bit between his teeth and pressed on. There can be no doubt that this was an important turning point in the negotiating process. From that moment on, negotiations assumed a brisker pace.

A story is told about how Ramaphosa and Meyer were out fishing together last year. Meyer got a fishhook lodged in his finger. There by the stream, Ramaphosa recommended to Meyer that the latter clench his teeth while he worked the hook out of Meyer's finger. Since then, the two have been an "item" at the negotiating show. They nod to each other and serious matters regularly cause them to go into a corner to confer.

Since CODESA [Conference for a Democratic South Africa], Ramaphosa has been heading the ANC's negotiating team. The Negotiating Council is in the process of entering the final phase of multiparty negotiations. With the election only nine months away, Ramaphosa is also faced with personal choices. He is a natural candidate for prime minister in the new democratically elected parliament. This means that he must give up his role as secretary-general of the organization.

Ramaphosa is unquestionably ambitious. There is nothing mediocre about him. He likes fast cars, tailored suits, and trout fishing. His wife, Nomazizi, has long since accepted the fact that he is always going to work for the "cause." But Ramaphosa, at 41 still relatively young, has his greatest challenge ahead of him: to get his voters to the ballot box, to achieve final victory, and then to make good on the dreams for the future of millions of people.

*** Activities of Katlehong Stability Unit Viewed**

93AF0816A Pretoria SERVAMUS in Afrikaans Aug 93 pp 9-12

[Article by David Strydom]

[Text] Violence has recently inundated the residential areas of the East Rand. One of its victims was a Pretoria policeman. The day after his senseless murder in Phola Park, crime reporter David Strydom accompanied the Katlehong Stability Unit during a night shift.

Focal points on the East Rand include Tokoza, where tensions exploded on 22 May of this year. The Goldstone Commission concluded that the march by African National Congress (ANC) supporters past the Tokoza hostel on that date was an error in judgment. When the participants in the march reached the hostel, a clash occurred between the demonstrators and hostel residents. To defuse a potentially disastrous situation, the police employed tear gas, rubber bullets, and fine shot. This action in no way caused any injuries or fatalities. A group of demonstrators then opened fire on the police with AK-47's.

After the confrontation, the chairman of the ANC's PWV [Pretoria, Witwatersrand, Vereeniging Industrial Area] Branch, Tokyo Sexwale, insisted that the policemen who had been involved in the clash be immediately dismissed. The commission, however, expressed its appreciation to the South African Police [SAP] for the responsible and sensitive manner in which its members acted on the day in question (a Captain Pieterse of the ABS [Department of Internal Stability] was specifically cited by the commission). Moreover, the ANC Alliance admitted that the attacks made on the police by its spokesman on the day in question were based on incorrect information.

"They have not stopped firing at us yet," says Constable Carl Minnie (20), while the reports of AK-47's echo under the cover of darkness. The Casspir [armored vehicle] we are riding in—driven by Const. Michael Minnie, Carl's twin brother—has to leave the road because of barricades at various locations.

Carl says the violence was caused by the march past the Tokoza hostel. Const. Donald Miller (27) says that it could have started in Mandela Park, where two ABS members were shot in the legs. Both policemen agree that it spread like a tidal wave and inundated all the East Rand residential areas. Katlehong was probably affected first.

"We cannot even get out to buy a Coke," Carl explains, "they are constantly shooting at us." There is a strange sound to his voice—as if it were a slap in the face to him that the community he serves has turned its AK-47's on him and his colleagues. Among the people in the Casspir, Carl and Michael have already experienced the full force of the fury that the murderers on the Rand have unleashed against the police. On 14 May of last year, Carl was shot in both thighs while patrolling in Phola Park. He has no feeling in his right foot and walks with a limp. He will limp the rest of his life. But Carl, who is a good-hearted person, just smiles at the disability. "The girls are crazy about it," he says.

Const. M.J. Ledwaba (28), who is also on patrol, is upset by the violence. He shakes his head. "That does not do any good," he says, "this is like a combat zone." M.J., a

veteran of 19 Unit, says he is not afraid but is ready to fight for law and order. Is he victimized in his own community because he is a policeman? "Fortunately, I do not live on the East Rand," he explains. "I come from Pietersburg and therefore I am relatively safe."

The streets of Katlehong, Tokoza, and Vosloorus are blocked off by stones, branches, furniture, and barbed wire. Burning tires are to be seen on every corner. Flames leap upwards and smoke hangs like a death shroud over the residential areas. At 2315 the first gasoline bomb is thrown. It hits the Casspir ahead of us and falls to the ground. Then the AK-47's begin to chatter. Michael coolly comments: "This is nothing—you should have been here last night." According to the policemen, they had been constantly under fire and had been pelted with gasoline bombs and stones. That was the night following the murder of Const. Leon Haarhoff (19) in the infamous Phola Park squatters camp.

"You have to be on guard," Carl explains, while gasoline bombs are still being hurled at the Casspir. "You have to watch out. They throw from behind the houses so that they have enough cover." At 2330 the Casspir drives down Maphiki Street. "We are practically guaranteed to be attacked on this street," says Donald, and the gasoline bombs indeed begin to rain down. In the distance there is the sound of AK-47's in the night. At one place Michael ducks frantically in his seat when yet another gasoline bomb is thrown.

The men in the Casspir all have families. That is the reason why the platoon leader, Sergeant Riaan Smit (21), has decided to bid farewell to the disturbances. He is waiting for a transfer to another post. "I have parents and my working at this day after day is a source of great concern to them," says Riaan. "Furthermore, I have served a lot of time in the disturbances." The mild-mannered Riaan is referring to the fact that he once was a member of 19 Unit. While he was in 19 Unit, he worked in Sebokeng, Alexandra, and Bisho.

Donald is getting married in December. His fiancée, Annemarie, is worried about the love of her life who is working in a combat zone in Katlehong. "She does not like it—she really hates it," he says. Carl and Michael are in the same boat. Carl's girl, Rita, is worried about him: "She is worse than my mother in that respect," he says laughing. And Michael's girl, Annemarie, is not at all happy about her boyfriend's decision to work in a combat zone.

One can only imagine the anxiety these policemen's families are experiencing. The public got a glimpse of it last year when Mrs. Joy Minnie, the twins' mother, talked about the horror she experienced when she was informed that one of her sons had been shot in Phola Park. M.J. Ledwaba, who is single, says he feels a lot safer when he is in Pietersburg. "My family lives there," he explains.

In the nearby village of Alberton the patrol stops for something to eat and drink. The atmosphere is less tense. The men talk about their experiences in the residential areas. The good humor one hears when the Soweto police

talk about their experiences with Soweto residents is missing. "It is war out there," says Michael, "they shoot at us a lot and there is always hostility." Although they do not say it, the men are aware that many of the people in the East Rand residential areas who are being protected by them would rather see them dead.

Policemen who work here will attest to the fact that working in those residential areas is not a pleasant job. "After a couple of hours we begin to look bad," Michael explains. "We have to work in the dust and often have to take cover. People who see us at the end of a shift cannot recognize us at all." There is also the problem of a lack of uniforms. Carl has to wash his camouflage trousers after every shift because he only has one pair and that causes the camouflage pattern to fade. Attempts by Internal Stability to get new camouflage uniforms have been in vain—at least in this instance.

The Casspir turns back to the residential areas—for yet another patrol. It is 0300 and Katlehong is quiet. Fires are only burning here and there. The members of the patrol are tired but they stay alert. Michael, who has been driving the Casspir since 1800 last evening, is still in good form. Later, we return to base. I have had enough but at least I can go my way. The men in camouflage have no choice. They must return to the combat zone—to the gasoline bombs and the AK-47's, to the stones and the barricades. They must again stare hate and death in the face.

The East Rand residential areas are on the verge of anarchy, but the men of the Katlehong Stability Unit are doing all in their power to save innocent lives. In exchange, they are being killed and maimed. This is a situation that no other civilized country in the world would tolerate.

* Natal: Origins of Ethnic, Political Violence

93AF0720A Cape Town LEADERSHIP in English No 12, 1993 pp 78-92

[Article by Paul Bell: "The Heart of Darkness"]

[Text] An incident in Natal: early in March, on the gravel road that threads its way north-east from the N3 near Pietermaritzburg, a taxi driver slowed for the incline ahead. At this point, gunmen armed with AK-47s, an R-1 and a shotgun charged from the bush, poured fire into the taxi, then fled. Ten people were killed.

Of the dead, what remained lay in the Camperdown mortuary, and the next-of-kin, having made identifications over the residual bags and boxes, seemed unwilling to take them away—as if to postpone final acknowledgment of what they had seen in the mortuary.

The first to leave was Mandalkosi Khanyezi.

He had been home on the Friday afternoon when people came to tell him there had been trouble up the road and that he should go there. The walk took him about 30 minutes. Once there he found his wife, Babazile Joyce

Khanyezi, 32, mother of four, shot dead. She had been coming home from her job as a domestic servant in Hayfields, Pietermaritzburg.

Now, he said in Zulu, he had had enough. Picking up his dead wife's black leather shoes, he walked away down the road further into the valley.

We followed him and, unsure of our reception, hesitated at his fence some 100 metres from the house, then walked across to the side of his beanfield. Khanyezi's sister was outside, crouching over a plastic basin filled with water and suds, rinsing the blood from her dead sister-in-law's shoes. Khanyezi gathered his children to him: "Fourteen, nine, six, and one year, four months," he said, tapping each one on the top of the head. "What shall I do now?"

If this were merely a turf battle between the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), then the well-publicised conflict in the Table Mountain area—the Maqongqo district—might have been considered largely resolved. But the violence has rumbled on, suggesting that the origins of the eight-year civil war in Natal are too complex to be explained on narrow grounds.

People are sick of death; but when they refuse to be roused, the professionals come with automatic weaponry to do the work that sticks and stones and fire once did for local bosses.

The struggle for Natal will be decisive for South Africa.

Here the tides of the past 150 years have reached a high water mark. Conquest, land alienation, migration, urbanisation, increasing poverty and oppression; the erosion of traditional values, the struggle for resources and power—these are the underpinning realities. Conservative estimates place the number of people killed in civil unrest in South Africa between September 1984 and September 1992 at well over 10,000. Of those, more than 6,500 died in Natal between 1987 and 1992, and violence monitors say the death rate since has continued at over 100 a month. This puts the number of politically motivated fatalities in Natal at 7,000 by the end of the first quarter of 1993. Graham Howe, editor of INDICATOR SA, calls the Natal conflict "a sort of Trojan horse" in our national politics. "Until peace is secured in the KwaZulu/Natal [KZN] region, the contagious spread of civil violence to the rest of the country will continue to undercut progress towards a national political settlement."

As for its economy, Jeff Guy, professor of history at the University of Natal (Durban) and biographer of Natal's turbulent Bishop John Colenso, puts his finger on Natal's condition: "What strikes one most is the geographical proximity and the social distance."

To look at the hills of the Durban Functional Region (DFR) is to understand what Guy means. Here is Africa's fastest growing metropolitan sprawl; its population has doubled and redoubled to more than four

million in the past 20 years, and will, despite declining rates of birth and urbanisation, reach five and a half million by the turn of the century.

Abject poverty and relative wealth live cheek by jowl. About 30 percent of the people of the DFR, in their shacks on the hills and their shelters on the streets and open squares of the city, live below the so-called Household Effective Level of Living.

Consider the following economic statistics—provided by Deloitte & Touche of Durban in a report for the KZN Joint Executive Authority (JEA), and largely agreed by Dr Michael Sutcliffe of the ANC's Southern Natal region:

- Of the country's nine development regions, Region E—which includes Natal and a slice of Transkei—has the second lowest GDP per capita.

- Natal's 8.7 million people constitute 23 percent of South Africa's population but generate only 14.7 percent of its GDP.

- Unemployment in Natal is the second highest in South Africa. The province can provide work for only 35 percent of its labour force, compared to an average absorption rate of 49 percent.

- Natal's dependency ratio of 2.8—the ratio between the number of economically active persons in employment to those not in employment, excluding children and the aged—is the highest in the country. The national average is 2.

- A low level of urbanisation—52 percent—compared to the national average of 66 percent.

In addition, current levels of violence are retarding the application of what funds have been made available for development and reconstruction. White wealth aside, this is a poor province. Sutcliffe's analysis is more blunt. He calls Natal "significantly underdeveloped." Why? "It was discrimination against blacks, plain and simple."

Contrary to the proponents of federalism, his view is that Natal can't be a viable state. It has to be part of a unitary state where a more centralised form of government has the resources to deliver. "For the people of Natal, the issue is a meaningful vote and a reconstruction process that delivers."

Up to 4.6 million people in the region—almost a quarter of the national electorate—will be eligible to go to the polls. Their choices will be stark.

Mangosuthu Buthelezi has committed his IFP to secure a new constitution that is strongly federal in character. But his former number two, Oscar Dhlomo, now chairman of the Institute for a Multi-Party Democracy, partly debunks the idea.

"Federalism!" he scoffs. "We have to learn to avoid these labels! These are the labels that make party experts irrational. Federalism is driven too much by fear and

emotion, too little by logic. Those who fear ethnicity think it will deliver them a boerestaat. Those who fear they have insufficient national support believe it will deliver them at least regional autonomy."

Natal's demand for federalism, in other words, is being driven off the back foot: it is less a matter of what it can deliver to people than of what it can deliver them from.

In Natal, the current debate is simply the latest point on a continuum of separatist sentiment that has two distinct strands, one white and one black, which run throughout Natal's history.

For whites, the federalist impulse dates to before Union. At the national convention of 1908-09, the British colonists proposed a loose federation that would offer them financial and physical security without compromising their internal autonomy. But they feared the Afrikaner less than they did the Zulu (still rebellious 30 years after the defeat of their Kingdom), and in the long depression that followed the Anglo-Boer war of 1899-1902, Natal also relied on the wealth of the Witwatersrand to sustain its economy. It settled for a second house of parliament, the Senate.

The federalist tendency continued to bubble under the surface of Natal politics: through the period of JBM Hertzog's Nationalist government from 1924-33; through the early 1950s when the Torch Commando in Natal directed its appeal, not at the preservation of coloured voting rights as elsewhere in the country, but at the preservation of English political power and culture in the province; through the victory of Afrikaner republicanism at the Commonwealth referendum in 1960; and through the collapse of the United Party in the late 1970s.

But under white leadership, the federalist tendency—the so-called Natal Option as it became known—was a no-hoper. The whites were always too few in number, too dependent on the national economy, too easily ignored. In the end, what was left of Natal's political autonomy was vested in a Provincial Council that the Nationalists had never succeeded in capturing—until, in the early 1980s, PW Botha's constitutional machine came for that too.

After the mid-1970s, when Buthelezi began to take up a regional option, as an extension of his efforts through KwaZulu and Inkatha to reassert the lost power and authority of the Zulu nation, federalism's prospects changed fundamentally. Here was a champion who numbered his support in millions, and because he spoke of moderation, he became an attractive option to whites and business.

For the past 13 years it has been Buthelezi who has driven the federal bus in Natal: from the Buthelezi Commission in 1980; through the Indaba's constitution for KZN—produced in 1986 and realised in part through the establishment of the JEA [Joint Executive Authority] binding the Natal Provincial Administration and the KwaZulu Government; and, at last, to the latter's December 1992 proposals for a federal constitution, including the mechanisms of regional government.

This proposal includes substantial measures of comfort for worried whites. It enshrines free enterprise and privatisation, and requires government to obtain a parliamentary majority of two-thirds before borrowing to fund expenditure. It entrenches minority rights and constitutional powers, and while establishing a variety of socio-economic rights, avoids making them binding on the state.

It encapsulates, in other words, an agenda diametrically opposed to the ANC's. The unitary option pursues what the ANC and its allies regard as their historic mission to dismantle apartheid and determine the priorities and policies of national reconstruction from the centre. The ANC concedes, however, the principle of regionalism: a concept it deliberately blurs but whose usage refers to the relegation of functions rather than the devolution of substantial powers, from the centre to the second and third tiers of government.

But for Inkatha, "regionalism" is a synonym for the more inclusive image that has replaced its once-powerful but now far less overt emphasis on "Zulu-ism."

In recent months, the IFP's negotiators have made regular, grim-faced assertions about how critical the federal issue is to Inkatha.

"This is what makes it such a knot," says Mervyn Frost, professor of political science at the University of Natal, Durban (UND). "If the IFP is not accommodated, heavy-handedness by the ANC or government will only fuel Zulu nationalism."

The IFP wants federalism to be secured in principle, hammered out by constitutional experts, and put to a national vote—yes or no. To have the issue decided by a constituent assembly dominated by the ANC would be to have it swept away.

Yet federalism in Natal is already ingrained in the actual machinery of provincial and metropolitan government. Consider the ANC's concern at the degree to which the work of a constituent assembly, and its own prospects for control over the province, have already been pre-empted. A recent internal strategy document warns of "a number of pre-emptive manoeuvres ... initiated by the KwaZulu government and other regional interest with a view to securing their regional positions and influencing national politics."

The JEA is "being positioned as a future regional executive authority..." The KwaZulu Finance Corporation, the document claims, "is being punted as the development arm of the JEA; it has recently expanded its role beyond the KZ boundary into Natal." And "regional bureaucracies are undertaking their own restructuring exercises. An example of this is the reorganisation of the Natal Provincial Administration; its DFR offices are being relocated to Durban on a large scale. This fits in with a possible scenario with Durban as the future capital of the region. It does not go unnoticed that the IFP have relocated their political and security operations to Durban. In addition there is a planned handover of

600,000 hectares of land to KZ [a potentially massive new source of patronage to KwaZulu].

"This reflects a co-ordinated effort to set up regional political institutions (JEA), development institutions (KFC), bureaucratic restructuring (NPA-KZ House of Delegates), and security structures (SADF-SAP [South African Defence Force-South African Police] regionalised-KZ)."

Such developments, says Pravin Gordhan, ex-Operation Vula operative and own vice-chairman of the South African National Civic Organisation, "do not augur well for the establishment of a democratic atmosphere or forward-looking development policy. There has been reasonable co-operation from various agencies on a project basis," he adds, citing the JEA, Inkatha and KwaZulu on the planned Cato Manor development project which, if successful, could provide homes for up to 200,000 people. "But when negotiations begin to affect powers and autonomy, they are very hesitant."

This is where, for the ANC, federalism and regional interests become, in Gordhan's words, "conflated and confused with vested interests." If the IFP is denied federalism, that would not stop Buthelezi from asking Natal to assert its opposition at the polls to elect a transitional government and constituent assembly. The proposition could well be put in somewhat different terms, however, as a choice between himself and Harry Gwala, the ANC's fiery Natal Midlands leader. That would be a right royal contest, raising all sorts of spectres in people's minds.

The ANC/IFP violence in Natal has since 1986 tended to obscure some longer-term perspectives necessary to make sense of the origins of the conflict.

For ten years, until the mid-1980s, the region had been to all intents and purposes the stamping-ground of Dr Buthelezi, South Africa's most prominent black leader neither jailed nor exiled. He was seen as a man of common sense pursuing a vision of harmony among black and white in Natal, and was received with honour in every major Western capital.

The province had also been long at peace—that is, until the United Democratic Front [UDF], surrogate for the ANC and its communist allies, began to denigrate Buthelezi and attack his supporters. As part of their strategy to overthrow the government by force they began to identify Inkatha and the KwaZulu government as enemies of the people.

To those at a distance from the conflict, or who found favour with Buthelezi's reasoned opposition to violence, sanctions and disinvestment, it took a while for the penny to drop: that what had gone wrong had been 200 years in the making. Today it is not so much the history that is in dispute, as the bits of it that are relevant to the present violence.

The founding of the Zulu nation through the subjugation of neighbouring tribes, and Shaka's construction of a war machine which held sway north, and then south, of the Tugela River, has long been mythologised by Zulu leaders and white politicians. By the 1840s, after Blood River, which provoked a civil war among the Zulus, their southern dominion in Natal was under threat from the Boers. This gave the British, holding Durban, a pretext to annex Natal in 1843—ostensibly to keep the peace but actually to secure their hold on the port and colonise Natal with its ready supply of cheap labour.

Disgruntled, the Boers went north, leaving the province to 100,000 Zulus and to the English. Within a decade these Zulus had been confined to less than 20 percent of the territory, and the rest dedicated to British settlement. From the 1850s, under Theophilus Shepstone, the Natal Zulus were pushed into reserves and steadily coerced, through the introduction of hut and marriage taxes, into wage labour on white farms.

The Kingdom to the north, meanwhile, had retained its integrity but its land was tempting to the Natal colonists. Between their avarice and Britain's quest for a federation in South Africa, a series of border incidents was parlayed into a crisis in relations with the Kingdom, and by 1879 Natal was spoiling for war. After Isandlwana, Cetshwayo was defeated and exiled.

Having broken the Kingdom militarily, the British dismantled its civil institutions, splitting it into 13 chiefdoms and reducing the King to chief of the Usuthu. A series of civil wars ensued, which led the British to annexe Zululand in 1887. Ten years later the colony was joined with Natal, which had since been granted "responsible government," and placed under its control.

Land pressure on the Zulus mounted; the sugar industry began to expand into Zululand; white farmers began to evict black tenants; tribesmen began to migrate to southern Natal and the Transvaal seeking work; and rinderpest and drought struck. A new poll tax, introduced in 1905 to induce more Africans into the labour market, sparked Chief Bambata's rebellion the following year. Three to four thousand Zulus were killed and Cetshwayo's son, Dinizulu, was convicted of treason and banished.

Emerging in Natal's backyard in the early part of the 20th century was a black urban working class, alienated from their lands and their traditional political structures, poorly paid and ruthlessly policed. In rural areas, land pressure, evictions and poverty were creating mounting poverty and disaffection—exacerbated by successive discriminatory land acts, pass laws, and the whole panoply of apartheid.

By the mid-1920s the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union, South Africa's first major trade union, had begun to mobilise in rural Natal. Under its regional secretary, George Champion, it made strides quickly and soon had branches dotted throughout the province. But its success was short-lived; farmers and the authorities retaliated and drove the ICU out.

Dinizulu's son, Solomon, spoke out against the ICU, accusing it of "exploiting poor Native workers." Its leaders were irresponsible, he said; they did not "understand the relation of capital to labour, the need for investment."

For the newer formations of resistance to white rule, the succession ran through ANC president Chief Albert Luthuli, who had beaten George Champion for the Natal leadership in 1951 and built the ANC to considerable strength in rural Natal by the end of the 1950s. Meanwhile, the ANC-aligned South African Congress of Trade Unions was organising in the industrial areas. Then fell the long night of the 1960s, and resistance from this quarter effectively ceased.

In the late 1960s Pretoria presented the Zulu chiefs with an opportunity to restore—after 90 years—a unified Zulu administration. This was in the form of a Territorial Authority, with the promise this might hold for the resurrection of traditional Zulu influence. In 1972 the TA gave way to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly [KLA], of which Buthelezi became chief minister. The chiefs would resist the state, using the structures and resources it provided to rebuild their power base.

Three years later Buthelezi re-established Inkatha which had first surfaced in the 1920s—ostensibly as a cultural movement. It was aimed at heading off any moves by Pretoria to push the KLA towards independence. The ANC gave Buthelezi their support.

Even so, the battle lines had been long drawn. On one side there was Inkatha, with its strong ethnic, traditionalist imperative, claiming the support of the great majority of Zulus; on the other, the ANC-aligned structures—unions, students and the like—which are products of the urban-industrial apartheid experience.

By 1980 Natal's leaders were beginning actively to consider how to accommodate the Chief Minister's political aspirations for the region. And the ANC, exiled in Lusaka, seeing that Buthelezi would insist on following his own judgment of political conditions and strategy, had already determined him a threat.

With the end of white minority rule certain, and Inkatha now openly challenging the ANC for a role in national politics, the conflict between the two exploded.

INDICATOR SA has published a valuable document, "Capturing the Event- Conflict Trends in the Natal Region 1986-1992," edited by Simon Bekker and Antoinette Louw. They have attempted to draw together both the scale of the conflict and the various analyses into an accessible conceptual grid to aid understanding of the aetiology of the war.

Johan Olivier of the Centre for Conflict Analysis at the Human Sciences Research Council sets the scene by citing three variables of key importance to the high levels of violence: popular discontent; increased access to

resources not previously available; and changes in the political opportunity structure, especially since 1990.

Bekker and Louw go on to identify five major groups of explanations of the violence, each with several elements, and all of which overlap considerably.

The first group of explanations is based on political competition between Inkatha (often supported by state agencies) and the UDF/ANC/Cosatu [United Democratic Front/African National Congress/Congress of South African Trade Unions]. According to this argument, South Africa's deeply politicised process of resource allocation has been linked, in Natal, to Inkatha's hold over the KwaZulu government. So much so that by the early 1980s issues like bus fare and rent increases in the township took shape as conflicts between youth groups, civic organisations and Inkatha-controlled local authorities.

In addition, as Pretoria's total strategy evolved during the 1980s, Inkatha-controlled institutions became tied willy-nilly into the security apparatus. This was at least partly a response to the strategies of "people's war" and a strategy of ungovernability prosecuted by the ANC from the mid-1980s; black townships would be made ungovernable by targeting the people who manned the institutions that controlled them.

This evolved inevitably into a pattern of attack and counter-attack; and the worst consequence was the legitimisation of violence as an instrument of liberation.

The second group of explanations of the violence argues that class, ethnic and other divisions have re-emerged with the weakening of apartheid and the economy. Lifting the pass laws gave rise to rapid urbanisation: rural people migrated in their thousands to the peri-urban areas of the Durban-Pietermaritzburg corridor, increasing competition for land, housing and infrastructure.

At the same time, the collapse of township government left a power vacuum which sucked youth groups, civics and vigilante movements into collision. All were variously supported by the two major political groups to which they had become aligned through circumstances on the ground. The ability of Inkatha to allocate resources, and its representation of indunas, chiefs, small-scale entrepreneurs and warlords, are cited as fundamental to the process of political identification.

In addition, conditions in informal settlements, being inimical to traditional communal and family values, created a pervasive sense of discontent, insecurity and purposelessness. "The fact that many participants in violent events are politically naive or even unaware of political currents underscores this argument," write Bekker and Louw. "Thus, though most conflict situations do become politicised, with opposing parties aligning themselves to particular political organisations, the emergence of 'newer forces', such as hit squads, trained assassins and 'the third force', points to the superficial political nature of much of the violence."

The third major theme cited by Bekker and Louw is a culture of violence, in which conflict is driven by a cycle of feuding over territory and resources, and revenge attacks. At issue here is whether attacks are motivated by revenge, or whether they are simply the product of the availability of weaponry and the breakdown of laws and order in Natal.

Theme four combines the following elements: the breakdown of traditional boundaries between racial/ethnic groups; demographic trends which promote the growth of informal settlements; an increase in resources, especially political, formerly not available to disadvantaged groups; and economic contraction. Theme five, not dissimilar, and essentially that of Canadian Heribert Adam, develops the notion of "insiders" who have access to urban resources.

So which party controls what areas? Clearly the main ANC strongholds are urban: the Durban-Pietermaritzburg corridor, and from there through the Midlands to Dundee and Ladysmith. Newcastle is uncertain. Both the north and south coasts have seen the ANC make heavy inroads—in Empangeni and Port Shepstone respectively—but fighting has been heavy. This appraisal is broadly conceded by Inkatha people.

Some people believe Ulundi is ANC, but that's brave talk. Inkatha runs rural Zululand, although the Ingwavuma area bordering Swaziland and Mozambique is claimed to be unknowable. Inkatha clearly has a grip on the inner reaches of the DFR. It is strong inland in southern Natal, although Umbumbulu has been a recent flashpoint, in Edendale close to Pietermaritzburg; and on the western edge of Natal in the foothills of the Drakensberg.

The death watch of the monitors shows up the sites of struggle well. Jenni Irish of the Human Rights Commission (HRC) listed the 115 deaths recorded in February as follows: north coast 39—although much of the violence there was related to tensions between security forces and residents at Kwambonambi; Durban area 38—mainly at Bhambayi in KwaMashu, an ANC area in conflict over resources; Midlands 10; Richmond 4 and Imbali 4—caused by tensions between residents and returning refugees; Port Shepstone 10 and Umbumbulu 10—the latter possibly a feud between residents and a local taxi owner.

By March the monitors themselves were too thin on the ground. There were about 20 international monitors representing the European Commission, the United Nations, the Commonwealth and the Organisation for African Unity [OAU]—and they could have used some co-ordination.

Sixteen Natal monitoring agencies have banded together as the Network of Independent Monitors (NIM), but their actual numbers are few. They have only 24 full-time monitors among them, and another 20 part-time, or weekend, monitors. But NIM's Jenni Irish concedes that despite the improved organisation of monitoring in Natal since late last year, the levels of violence have risen again. And UND's Mervyn Frost describes the peaces won through monitoring as very much like international truces; little is actually settled.

The Peace Accord is violated daily and there is as yet no mechanism to call transgressors to account. People have generally lost confidence in it. Natal's regional resolution dispute committee has managed to set up five local committees. Port Shepstone's met with some considerable success. There were 206 killings in the area between September and November 1992; by February/March the death rate had dropped to 20. Others in Newcastle, Umlazi and Pinetown had had limited success while that in Stanger had virtually collapsed. There was nothing on the north coast, where 39 died in February, and attempts were being made to set up one for the Midlands, Vryheid and Richmond. All told, Peace Accord structures had not yet to come to grips with Natal.

Law and order in the province has broken down. Academics and lawyers widely agree that the fault lies in community mistrust of the security forces for their failure to apprehend killers, and a consequent lack of faith in the criminal justice system and its ability to protect witnesses. Pietermaritzburg South MP Rob Haswell (Independent ANC) makes the point: "There were more than 200 murders in the Midlands last year [287, according to the HRC], of which 30 percent led to prosecutions. Only 20 percent of the prosecutions led to convictions."

Parallel to this is the continuing inflow of weaponry. Both sides are well armed and well trained. Umkhonto we Sizwe continues to send its cadres abroad for training and is known to run a sophisticated supply line—despite recent and embarrassing weapons-smuggling busts by the police. As for Inkatha, the SAP [South African Police] have tried in vain to recall the huge number of G3 automatic weapons issued by the KwaZulu government to local leaders—on the south coast to youngsters of 13 and 14, said the Centre for Legal Resources' Howard Varney in a submission to the Goldstone Commission recently.

Both sides are in an arms race and, as Mervyn Frost points out, there's no point any more in talking about who started it.

For either side to contemplate disarming would be judged a serious folly. Under such conditions, where the politics are, as Frost describes them, "territorially driven and thoroughly militarised," and when both sides produce long lists of areas where they claim their organisers are unable to operate, can a free and fair election be conducted in Natal?

A constitutional referendum, were one to be held, would establish a basis for co-operation and reconciliation prior to an election, says Gavin Woods, director of the Inkatha Institute. "An elected constituent assembly equals mobilisation for the biggest blank cheque in our history, and the stakes will be so high that it could unleash enormous aggression."

John Aitchison of the Centre for Adult Education at the University of Natal in Pietermaritzburg Centre, acknowledges the difficulties of holding a peaceful election: "It will be very difficult." Howard Varney of the CLR agrees: "Very few people anticipate a free and fair election. The

prospects are quite frightening. We are bracing ourselves for massive intimidation." Oscar Dhlomo says: "It is very difficult to foresee the possibility of a free and fair election. But," he cautions, "I would also be wary of the mentality of saying that because there is violence, there should be no election. This plays into the hands of those who fear elections and democracy. Violence cannot be allowed to determine the pace of transition."

He and Frost agree on the importance of elections to the process of restoring legitimacy to government—as a starting point for the restoration of popular confidence and law and order.

How to do it, then? Everybody agrees: flood the province with troops. It's a special tribute to the SADF [South African Defense Forces] to hear people such as Aitchison, Varney and Irish, who two years ago would have chanted "troops out, troops out," say instead, as Irish put it: "I would deploy the army in great strength." And Aitchison: "Saturate the province."

The ANC has even called for international troops. That seems unlikely but a flood of monitors, certainly, is on the cards. Aitchison also recommends mobile polling booths, and the removal of party tables to at least 500 metres from polling centres. And try, says Dhlomo, to bind the IFP and the ANC to accept the outcome of an election!

All sides are gearing up as best they can. Everybody is on new terrain. Not even the much vaunted Nationalist election machine has much to go on, or place to go. Greytown Independent ANC MP Pierre Cronje will run the campaign for the ANC in Natal; his opposite number will be Joe Matthews, chief executive of the IFP, son of one of the ANC's early leading members, ZK Matthews, and himself a former prominent ANC Youth Leaguer.

As for whites, Inkatha will doubtless argue that a vote for either the National or Democratic parties is a vote for Harry Gwala. The DP, say two of its former MPs in the province, Pietermaritzburg's Mike Tarr (PMB North) and Rob Haswell (South), will be wiped out. Both MPs have jumped ship—Tarr to the IFP, Haswell to the ANC. Said Haswell: "When Mike Tarr jumps to the IFP you can be sure the Natal cocktail circuit is looking seriously at the party. But federalism as separatism will be stillborn."

Jurie Mentz of Vryheid has abandoned the National Party for the IFP, although no-one in the NP [National Party] seem to be tragically devastated by the move. It may be, suggested somebody, that Mentz will be the NP's stalking horse inside Inkatha.

George Bartlett, Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs and leader of the NP in Natal (the party has ten seats in the House of Assembly), argues as follows:

"The Zulu are disciplined, hard workers. We will bind together and Natal will become a winning province. But

there is a viper in the bed—it is radicalism and revolutionism. If the ANC can destroy Inkatha and make the Zulus submissive, who will oppose them? A Zulu is a Zulu is a Zulu. When the chips are down, and all of Africa's history tells it, ethnicity is the core. The question is, do we have to have these lovely people submit to another form of tyranny?

Not even Inkatha speaks like that any more.

Which way business will jump is not entirely clear. Historically, it has gone with the forces that appear to represent stability and moderation, and became heavily predisposed to Buthelezi during the 1980s. Today the choice is more complex: what happens to business and investment if Natal finds itself at odds with the centre, and continues to be developmentally prejudiced because of it? To be sure, leaders like S.A. Sugar Association chairman Tony Ardington are federalists at heart, but he for one has drawn the line at the sort of separatist defiance that characterises much of the federalist rhetoric abroad in the province.

On the one hand, Buthelezi has always given businessmen a consistent economic message: and they would probably prefer to stay with him though the shifting balance of power has yet to settle and they will wait until the last before making their decision.

The IFP's Joe Matthews considers the election at two levels. Contrary to every opinion poll in recent history, he thinks the IFP could do well at national level and possibly even emerge as the biggest party, although without a majority. At regional level, where the choice posited is between Buthelezi and Harry Gwala, he predicts outright victory.

For Gwala, an old man now quite severely incapacitated by his motor neuron affliction, immersed in the mindset of ceaseless struggle, elections are a sort of abstraction.

He is generally regarded as being out on a limb, although he has recently been forced to come out strongly in support of the current peace initiative. He does, however, have one significant advantage: his unreconstructed Marxist radicalism is a vote-puller among the ANC's many very hard-pressed supporters, and is therefore not something the ANC could determinedly slap down in an election.

It remains to be seen whether the IFP can begin to articulate a more coherently reconstructionist, redistributionist message that might undercut the appeal of the Freedom Charter and save the party from falling back on ethnic nationalism.

In the rural areas, though, all that may be immaterial. "A party with strong rural roots finds it easy to tell people to vote as their chief advises," says Matthews. "The choice is clear: Do you vote for the Prince [Buthelezi] or for Gwala?"

It could be put a little differently: a choice for the peace that might have saved the dead of Enkanyazini.

Angola**UNITA Accepts Bicesse Accords, '92 Election Outcome***AB0610174093 Paris AFP in English 1703 GMT 6 Oct 93*

[Excerpt] Abidjan, Oct 6 (AFP)—Angola's rebel UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] movement Wednesday [6 October] decided to recognize the outcome of last year's general elections and the "validity" of the May 1991 Bicesse Peace Accords, a UNITA statement said.

In a communique sent to AFP in Abidjan, UNITA said the decisions were taken at an "extraordinary meeting" of the political commission of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola held between September 28 and October 6.

Angola plunged back into civil war when the rebel movement last October refused to accept that it had lost the U.N.-supervised general elections held at the end of September.

The political commission of Jonas Savimbi's movement, meeting in the Angolan central highlands town of Huambo, decided also to "reaffirm the validity of the Bicesse Accords as the basis of the peace process in Angola," the statement said.

However, the accords would have to be "brought up to date," UNITA added. [passage omitted]

Reiterates Wish for Talks With MPLA*MB0710092093 Jamba Voz da Resistencia do Galo Negro in Portuguese 0600 GMT 7 Oct 93*

[Text] The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA] Political Commission which has been meeting in Huambo since 26 September 1993, yesterday was still holding its session searching for a solution for peace in Angola. The UNITA leadership is discussing maintaining the current unilateral cease-fire, sending UN troops to supervise it, and holding direct contacts with the special representative of the UN secretary general in Angola. The UNITA Political Commission reiterates to the international community, particularly the United Nations, its readiness to resume talks with the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola [MPLA].

Commission Releases 'Final Communique'*MB0710142793 Jamba Voz da Resistencia do Galo Negro in Portuguese 1200 GMT 7 Oct 93*

["Final Communique" issued by the UNITA Political Commission in Huambo on 6 October 1993]

[Text] An extraordinary meeting of the Political Commission of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA] took place in the city of

Huambo between 28 September and 6 October 1993. After exhaustive deliberations, the meeting decided on the following:

1. To reaffirm the validity of the Bicesse Accords as the basis of the peace process in Angola, although they must be brought up to date.

2. To reiterate the validity of the results of the elections held on 29 and 30 September 1992, although it considers them fraudulent. The UNITA Political Commission feels that the institutions resulting from these elections must reflect the present stand maintained by UNITA and other opposition forces. A respect for human rights must be guaranteed to the Angolan people, particularly the right to life.

3. To consider the Abidjan Protocol as a serious basis for negotiations between the government of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola [MPLA] and UNITA.

4. The UNITA Political Commission took note of the UN Security Council resolutions and reiterates its readiness to cooperate with Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, special representative of the UN secretary general in Angola, in search of a genuine and lasting solution to the Angolan conflict. It would like to call on the United Nations to concentrate its efforts on bringing the two parties closer in order to achieve an all-embracing and effective cease-fire.

5. To maintain the cease-fire which UNITA declared unilaterally on 20 September 1993 and to request UN observers to confirm its observance. The UNITA Political Commission would also like to request that humanitarian aid be distributed to the needy people without discrimination.

6. To emphasize that although the resort to summit meetings is a very praiseworthy thing, past experience has shown that they do not resolve complex conflict situations like the one existing in Angola. This stand was conveyed to the special representative of the UN secretary general in Abidjan on 15 September 1993.

7. UNITA's Armed Forces fully support the quick resumption of negotiations between the MPLA government and UNITA, and it is up to the special representative of the UN secretary general to announce the date.

[Signed] The UNITA Political Commission

[Dated] Huambo, 6 October 1993

C-130's Reportedly Violate Menongue Airspace*MB0610205493 Luanda TPA Television Network in Portuguese 1930 GMT 6 Oct 93*

[Text] The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA] has not ceased its military actions. These actions are now directed against the city of Menongue in Cuando Cubango Province. Over the past

few days, it increased the violation of the airspace in Cuando Cubango and resumed the shelling of the city of Menongue.

[Begin unidentified correspondent recording] The city of Menongue is expected to experience a very difficult period inasmuch as its airspace is being systematically violated by planes coming from unknown places with a view to assisting Savimbi troops. Captain Adelino Sambo, (?from) the Command of the Angolan Armed Forces [FAA] in Cuando Cubango, once again reported the violation of Menongue airspace at Caiundo, 147 km west of Menongue, yesterday, 5 October, by two Hercules C-130 planes between 1600 and 1800. Avelino Sambo said the two planes flew from Ngombe, UNITA operational command in Huambo, with the aim of supplying its troops in Menongue.

The same source also said that the Black Cockerel's men recently increased the shelling of FAA positions and the wards on the outskirts of the city. Yesterday they killed two people and wounded two others who were going to their farms to search for food.

Meanwhile, in response to a UNITA attack 16 km to the west of Menongue at 1400 yesterday, government forces killed two UNITA soldiers and seized their weapons. Also yesterday, more than 51 civilians held captive by UNITA at (Capingue) to the north of Menongue, presented themselves to the government authorities. [end recording]

UNITA Assembling Men, Material at Cuito

MB0710075193 Luanda Radio Nacional Network in Portuguese 0600 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] The situation in the city of Cuito is still deplorable. The siege on the city imposed by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA] prevents its residents from going to the fields in search of food. As a result of this, at least 50 people are dying in the city daily. There is also an extensive movement of UNITA soldiers and war materiel and this leads us to believe the movement is planning to renew attacks to occupy the city. Our correspondent Abel Abraao reports from Cuito.

[Begin Abraao recording] The UNITA rebels maintain the siege of the city of Cuito. Black Cockerel's men prevent free movement of people and goods and have also occupied houses of civilians in areas they are assembled. They are also stealing the residents' property [words indistinct]. Jonas Savimbi's UNITA is still assembling soldiers and war equipment in the outskirts of Cuito city. The UNITA rebels have moved long range war materiel from southern to eastern Cuito, where their forward command post is located. [end recording]

Bie Governor Comments on Cuito Situation

MB0610141893 Luanda TPA Television Network in Portuguese 1930 GMT 5 Oct 93

[Studio interview with Bie Province Governor Luis Paulino dos Santos by an unidentified correspondent—live]

[Text] [Correspondent] Good evening, Mr. Governor.

[Santos] Good evening.

[Correspondent] What do you have to say about the situation in Cuito based on reports from the area?

[Santos] According to reports we have received, since the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA] initiated the war and destruction, the situation has not improved. There has been no improvement, even though UNITA declared a unilateral cease-fire. The truth is that we have been witnessing extremely provocative movements by UNITA forces, who have been within 500 meters of positions defended by the government. This leads us to believe that sooner or later, clashes may resume. UNITA is using the hospital and cemetery as its headquarters, where it assembles its soldiers and war materiel. We have also received reports that UNITA is assembling soldiers and military equipment in Piloto Ward, which is located near Cuito Airport.

[Correspondent] Mr. Governor, does the fact that UNITA is digging trenches for its forces mean that this situation will continue for a long time?

[Santos] Of course. We believe that if UNITA does not withdraw its forces, clashes are imminent.

[Correspondent] This means that the people will continue suffering for a long time. Is there any indication that food will reach the area soon?

[Santos] We do not have information on that. We know that the UN Angola Verification Mission and the representative of the UN secretary general in Angola have been making efforts to get security guarantees from UNITA for that purpose.

[Correspondent] It is difficult to maintain the present situation in Cuito without food and other resources. What do you think of this?

[Santos] Of course, the city of Cuito has been transformed by UNITA into an abyss where the living mix with the dead. It is an extremely difficult situation. No one is able to classify it [words indistinct] idea of what is happening in the city.

[Correspondent] Will the defense of the city, nevertheless, be maintained?

[Santos] Our forces are ready for anything.

[Correspondent] Mr. Governor, the time is too short to discuss fully a critical situation such as the one in Cuito. I thank you very much for your presence here.

President Appoints Deputy Provincial Governors

MB0710060293 Luanda Radio Nacional Network in Portuguese 1900 GMT 6 Oct 93

[Text] President of the Republic Jose Eduardo dos Santos today appointed Domingos Antonio Jacinto as deputy governor of Bengo Province, replacing Carlos Belo; Antonio Jose Fernandes as deputy governor of Cuanza Norte Province, replacing Antonio Fernandes da Cruz; and Mario Salomao as deputy governor of Moxico Province, replacing (Joao Palhaco). Helder Claudino Albuquerque has been relieved as deputy governor of Namibe Province.

Appoints Attorney General, Creates Secretariat

MB0710060393 Luanda Radio Nacional Network in Portuguese 1900 GMT 6 Oct 93

[Text] Under the terms of the powers vested in him by Article 66 of the Constitution, His Excellency Engineer Jose Eduardo dos Santos, president of the republic, today appointed Domingos Cololo as the new attorney general and public prosecutor. He replaces Antero de Abreu, who had been in office since independence.

The president of the republic created the Secretariat of State for War Veterans. Pedro Jose van Dunem has been appointed as its secretary.

*** Catholic Church Fears Influx of Muslims**

93P50247B Lisbon VISAO in Portuguese 8 Jul 93 p 45

[Text] In 1985, when the Angolan Government was having difficulty responding to South African air raids, al-hdhaifi made a promise to the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola]: Libya would provide men and planes in exchange for concessions to facilitate the expansion of Islam in that country.

The proposal was rejected bearing in mind the influence of Catholicism in Angola.

Following the signing of technical-military cooperation protocols between the Angolan Government and Israel, certain Arab countries, such as Libya and Saudi Arabia, turned to UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola]. Now, with the arrival in Luanda of many Arab businessmen or Muslims (Lebanese, Senegalese, and Malians, among others), Catholic elements are worried about the expansion of Islam—there is already a mosque in the capital.

*** AIA President Comments on Economic Stagnation**

93AF0801B Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 6 Aug 93 p 12

[Text] In an interview published yesterday in the JORNAL DE ANGOLA, the president of the Industrial Association (AIA), Jose Manuel Inacio, characterized the country's economic situation and pointed to limitations on imports of products that could be manufactured in Angola as one of the solutions to the crisis. Jose Manuel Inacio also defended supporting national industries so as to increase their efficiency.

"Angola's industries are currently operating at just 10 percent of their capacity due to the war, and the nation's politicians simply must understand each other so that there will be peace and we can survive," the industrialist said to the newspaper.

Referring to Huila, in the southern part of the country, a region that he knows the best because it is the location of his factory, Jose Manuel Inacio stated that, if there were major investments in the province, it "could solve the food problem of most of the country, and particularly that of the Angolan Armed Forces."

The drop in productivity touches almost all sectors of the Angolan economy. In Cabinda, the level of wood processing falls far short of those of 1973, due essentially to the war in the Maiombe area.

The director of production at the forestry development center in Cabinda, Manuel Barata, said yesterday that the cutting of wood is restricted to Malembo, and in a radius of 20 km, due to the war.

In 1973, two years before the country's independence, the enclave was harvesting 13 types of wood, some of which were considered "precious," such as *pau-preto*.

At that time, Portugal's forestry policy for Angola consisted of progressively cutting back the number of licenses, especially for the most valuable species, Manuel Barbosa explained. Since then, those species "have undergone reductions on the order of 10 to 50 percent."

"Forest exploitation has been slowly diminishing since 1988," when Imexpal Cubana-Tecnica ended its cooperation with its Angolan partner, Emadeira Angolana. Manuel Barbosa went on to recall that Cuba had coparticipated in the cutting of wood since the first years of Angola's independence.

Mozambique

Journalists Strike in Maputo Over Salary Increase

MB0610123093 Maputo Radio Mozambique Network in Portuguese 0400 GMT 6 Oct 93

[Text] Journalists and production cadres from Radio Mozambique, MOZAMBIQUE INFORMATION

AGENCY, Mozambique Television, and the Media Institute today went on strike until 10 October. The government commission negotiating with the journalists was informed of the decision by Hilario Matusse, secretary general of the National Organization of Journalists [ONJ]. The strike follows a deadlock in negotiations in which the government offered a 15-percent salary increase to all public media personnel. The increase was rejected by the journalists and production cadres, who maintain their demand for a 100-percent increase. The Council of Ministers has issued a communique saying that it is open to dialogue to find solutions for the existing problems, but the country's economic reality must be taken into account. The government says it will do everything to maintain a minimum information service in the public interest.

Meanwhile, in another communique issued yesterday, the ONJ and the ad hoc commission and production cadres said they are also open to new proposals during the strike.

Radio Remains on Air

MB0610182993 Maputo Radio Mozambique Network in Portuguese 1030 GMT 6 Oct 93

[Station commentary]

[Text] Despite the five-day strike called yesterday by the Executive Secretariat of the ONJ [National Organization of Journalists], Radio Mozambique remains on the air, because in all conscience, some of its staff members, although they do not earn a salary that meets their and their families' needs, believe that the right of the people to information justifies such a decision. Actually, Radio Mozambique remains on the air because the right of the people to information has for a long time now posed another demand: that we overcome the strong possibility of station's transmitters coming to a standstill. The transmitters have been operating for over 40 years, though their expected lifetime is 15 years.

Even during the recent war, which seems to have stopped, when sabotage affected electricity supplies to our transmitters and studios—in other words, when we were forced to be silent, even for a brief period—we were the ones who apologized to our listeners for the breaks in transmission. In fact, even without war, today we still experience power cuts. Although these are beyond our control, we are the ones who apologize to our listeners for the breaks in transmission, even if they are brief.

Radio Mozambique does not wish to find itself in the ridiculous situation of having to apologize for a break in transmission that has not been caused by an event beyond its control. This station claims to uphold the right of the people to information. Radio Mozambique regards itself as a privileged instrument that enables each listener to be in touch with the rest of the country, and—why not say it?—with the rest of the world. Moreover, after the proclamation of national independence, Radio Mozambique regarded itself as being in the forefront of the campaign for

national unity and social stability. All that was done for the listener and with the listener.

Boycott of Strike 'Shame'

MB0610185593 Maputo Radio Mozambique Network in Portuguese 1730 GMT 6 Oct 93

[Text] In a communique just in, the Executive Secretariat of the National Organization of Journalists [ONJ] and the Ad Hoc Commission have expressed astonishment and concern over what they regard as an conspicuous and intimidatory security apparatus to protect the buildings of several public news media organs.

Regarding a commentary carried by Radio Mozambique today, the communique denies that it has been in all conscience that some journalists did not adhere to the strike. The ONJ communique points out that the attitude of those journalists has been motivated by the nature of their duties. The communique also notes that the boycott of the strike by a small group of professionals was a shame to their class.

Chissano on Journalists Demands

MB0710133693 Maputo Radio Mozambique Network in Portuguese 0500 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] President Joaquim Chissano said in Maputo yesterday that it is necessary to find a viable and possible solution for journalists of the public sector who have been on strike since yesterday. The head of state said this is an important problem, the solution depends on the understanding of the information workers. He said: it is in fact an important problem, but one cannot demand an impossible solution. The president stated; if people make impossible demands, we shall have no response.

Meanwhile Cooperation Minister Jacinto Veloso, who is leading the government delegation in the negotiations with the National Organization of Journalists [ONJ] Ad Hoc Commission, yesterday told NOTICIAS newspaper that the government is working so that Radio Mozambique, Mozambique Television, and the MOZAMBIQUE INFORMATION AGENCY [AIM] may soon be transformed into public enterprises. Minister Jacinto Veloso reiterated that the government cannot allocate more than a 15 percent salary increase, taking into account the country's current economic situation. The journalists and production cadres have rejected the 15 percent salary increase.

*** Nyanga Base Receives First Trainees**

93AF0799A Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 18 Aug 93 p 11

[Article by Alexandre Chiure, reporting from Nyanga]

[Text] Directed by officers from the British Army, Nyanga, situated 130 km from the border area of Machipanda in the central province of Manica, has for three weeks been "testing the capacity" of the 100

trainees sent there by the government and by Renamo [Mozambique National Resistance] to "assimilate the subject matter," while awaiting the arrival of the other 440 (220 from each side) before starting the most important courses, which will last 16 weeks.

The British commander of Nyanga, Lieutenant Colonel Martin Robert, said that the 100 trainees now there—both commissioned and noncommissioned officers—will be integrated into the second group, thereby facilitating the creation of an atmosphere of mutual trust among the 540 military personnel from both sides who will be settled in that camp.

Nyanga began functioning early in the 1980's as part of the military cooperation between Harare and London and was used to train military personnel for Zimbabwe. After 1986, Nyanga also began training Mozambican Army commandos.

With its monthly expenses of more than 200,000 pounds sterling being borne by the British Government, the border camp [previous word published in English] consists of a group of 16 huts, some of them of conventional construction and others merely tents set up to increase the number of men the encampment can accommodate. The 100 Mozambican trainees sport typically British uniforms and fulfill a daily training program that starts at 0630 and runs nine hours straight.

High expectations and great enthusiasm about the training of the Armed Defense Forces of Mozambique reign among the trainees selected from both sides. "The training schedule is very tight. Perhaps that is why the soldiers from the government and Renamo armies do not have enough time to think about personal conflicts," Martin Robert, the Briton, said.

The classes, both theoretical and practical, are given in English and translated into Portuguese by a "battalion" of 30 military interpreters furnished by the Maputo government.

The 213 Zimbabwean and 30 British military personnel working at Nyanga, distributed throughout the command and administrative support structure, teach subjects pertaining to weaponry, communications, first aid, topography, field strategy, and management of firing ranges, both conventional and in the jungle, using real ammunition.

"The work here is hard and grueling," said British Captain Lea Mayo Charndes, a public relations officer, in describing the kind of training the 100 Mozambicans are getting.

A government soldier, Patricio Nkingule, 28, complained in statements to DIARIO DE NOTICIAS at Nyanga that despite benefiting from good logistic support, he had not even \$1.00 to buy cigarettes, razor blades, or postage stamps. Nkingule, a native of the northern province of Cabo Delgado who joined the government forces four years ago, termed the working

environment at Nyanga "excellent" and the relations with Renamo men as one of "camaraderie."

Samuel Suala, 22, a native of Miaffa in northern Mozambique, has been a Renamo guerrilla since 1985. He said it was an honor to be chosen for training at Nyanga and said he could bear witness to "the pure air" one breathes at that military center, something that will become part of the history of the training of the single Mozambican Army.

The encouraging pace of the preparation of the future instructors and commanding officers of the new Mozambican Army is in sharp contrast to what is happening on the political plane. Take, for example, the process of billeting and demobilizing the approximately 100,000 men on both sides. Furthermore, the training of the Armed Forces of Mozambique cannot begin yet because Chissano and Dhlakama have yet to resolve the impasses that have developed in the implementation of the peace accords, especially as regards territorial administration issues.

The UN Mission in Mozambique confirmed that eight troop billeting centers are now ready for immediate use and 10 more have been inspected, out of the total of 49 designated by the government and Renamo. Even so, the kickoff of this operation has not occurred. Meanwhile hundreds of soldiers are being kept at their bases awaiting "new orders" and experiencing unprecedented hunger, owing to lack of logistic support.

*** German NGO Activities in Nhamatanda Described**

93AF0809A Maputo TEMPO in Portuguese 8 Aug 93 pp 13-15

[Article by Antonio Elias]

[Text] If one could illustrate the work that NGO's [nongovernmental organizations] are doing in Mozambique, the best portrait might be found in the country's central region, where in addition to the prolonged war between the government and Renamo [Mozambican National Resistance], the sudden drought has pushed thousands of families into conditions of absolute misery.

In Nhamatanda, Sofala Province, and along the Beira Corridor, 200,000 families have gathered, abandoning their native zones. Most of them, 80 percent, arrived last year, 1992. The situation that then resulted "here in Sofala and Manica was one of profound despair," as described by German Agrarian Action Administrator Lutz Sarzio. He came to assist everyone, and the number of needy in Manica Province, for example, rose from tens of thousands of dislocated persons to close to a million. Practically the province's entire population was in a refugee situation. Worse than that, however, was that there was no water.

Lutz Sarzio recounts that his organization then had to take responsibility for the survival of 100,000 people: 50,000 in Nhamatanda and the same number in Manica Province, most of them in Sussundenga District: "Some

40,000 people had gathered in that district," he recalls. "We provided food assistance in Sussundenga to that entire population from last October to this March. The situation has now improved. It is even close to normal."

That is no longer the case in Nhamatanda. Lutz Sarzio says that "we cut the supply of corn there in April. It is true that there are many people who are not producing, but we no longer have any food to give. We are continuing to provide beans and oil because there are thousands of people suffering from Kwashiorkor."

Even though the first emergency situation has apparently ended, a second wave of the same conditions is now occurring. The Agrarian Action administrator in Chimoio says that within a short time Barue and Guro Districts will have many problems with populations returning from Zimbabwe, "but it is a case outside our sphere of activity," he says, deferring to the UNHCR (UN High Commission for Refugees).

Agrarian Action is going to divert its attention to Tambara District, where because of its location and the condition in which it was left, the situation is all the more critical. It is one of the first cases we witnessed in which the district administration moved the capital for a period of 10 years. As of June, when we were there, the administration was continuing to take refuge in Nhacafula, a town in the district.

There are some 16,000 people there who live practically isolated from the world. Clothing is in serious need at the site, and the general conditions are very precarious. Of the houses that once comprised the town, there is not a single structure still standing. Entire walls were knocked down. The German Agrarian Action plan at the site is to distribute clothing and food to that subdivided population. Lutz Sarzio says that "8,500 are from Tambara and 7,200 from Renamo." That is a division that makes no sense, even less so given the nature of this work.

* Politicians' 'Flaunting of Wealth' Noted

93AF0798D Lisbon O INDEPENDENTE in Portuguese
6 Aug 93 p 23

[Article by L.C.: "Maputo's Wealthy"; first paragraph is O INDEPENDENTE introduction]

[Text] The Mozambican politicians are being careless. Their flaunting of wealth could cost them dearly. On the best streets in Maputo, more and more luxurious houses are being erected.

One of the favorite pastimes of the ordinary citizen of Maputo consists in strolling around certain restored zones in the city, observing the progress of the construction of new residences for the Mozambican officials. The fact is that the latter are not hiding their wealth.

On the Avenida do Zimbabwe, a house is under construction for Prime Minister Mario Machungo, with a swimming pool, marble interiors, and a jacuzzi. On Freidrich Engels Street, where the Portuguese ambassador lives, construction is proceeding apace on a luxurious residence for a minister, at an estimated cost of at least \$300,000.

Marcelino dos Santos, president of the Assembly, opted for a three-story mansion, complete with elevator, in the "Caracol" zone, quite near the belvedere overlooking the Mozambican capital.

It cannot be said, however, that these political leaders are being very clever. At a time when corruption is about to be rooted out, such ostentation could cost them dearly.

Other ministers, more prudent, have opted for very low-profile solutions. This is the case with Transport Minister Armando Guebuza, the number three man in the Frelimo [Mozambique Liberation Front] and the chief negotiator with the Renamo [Mozambique National Resistance]. He is building his luxury home in a zone in the suburbs, in the Manotas, well camouflaged among the many reed houses—thus, discretion.

This scheme was also employed by Minister Aguias Mazula, who will have his residence outside the "cement zone," out near the airport.

On the other hand, company directors and superintendents of ministries are living quite public lives, building or rebuilding mansions in the choice areas of the city.

The analysts say that this display of "abuse, indifference, and arrogance" by the cadres is possible only because of assurances and guarantees obtained from all the possible political factions. In other words, in Maputo the consensus is that "these people are negotiating with the Renamo and the small civilian political groupings," which helps to explain what the president of the Renamo is saying when he declares that he is not concerned about the shortage of cadres in his movement and that "there are always individuals who can fill the technical positions."

Model of a Technician

The precise sense of what, today, is a disinterested and chemically pure Mozambican technician is exemplified by Prakash Ratilal, former minister and governor of the Central Bank of Mozambique, who, since 1976, has been a prominent member of Mozambique's economic team—the team which in 1977 and 1978 intervened in the Mozambique refinery.

Today Prakash Ratilal is an adviser to entrepreneur Manuel Boullosa. He is also nothing more or less than the author of the document on which Boullosa, the former owner of the refinery, based his petition for indemnification from the Maputo government for the installations and machinery of the company. The study, which was released in Mozambique and in Portugal, has already been called "exaggerated and clearly biased."

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13 OCTOBER 93

